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Among other things, this thesis touches on what we have reason to do. And surely, I have 
much reason to express my appreciation for those who through their agency, in one way 
or another, helped to bring this work to fruition. 
 
No doubt, to thank all those who played a part would be too daunting a task. On some 
accounts of “playing a part,” the following is true: 
“S plays a part in X if the following counterfactual is true of any of S’ actions (say A): 
If A had not occurred, X would not have occurred.” 
Since it is not the place to analyse the aforementioned counterfactual any further, suffice 
to say that on such accounts, I would probably have to thank agents as diverse as Issac 
Newton, Plato, and perhaps even Schopenhauer’s poodle. 
 
So then, that won’t do very well. In its place, I propose a more intuitive criterion for 
determining who to thank – namely those who fulfills the following necessary conditions: 
i) Someone I know personally. 
ii) Someone I sincerely appreciate and whose help or support I am truly grateful 
for. 
iii) Someone who name looks nice on paper. 
It should be clear to any rational person that these criteria are maximally appropriate 
under the current circumstances. And with that settled, here are the people who really 
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belong on this page (yes, your names look nice on paper): 
 
Dr Michael Walsh Pelczar, for being a supportive and flexible supervisor. For the helpful 
suggestions and very penetrating criticisms. You have helped me to deepen my thinking 
on the issues herein and improved my philosophizing. 
 
The beautiful people in NUS philosophy, especially: Jason, John, Joanna, Liling, Aldo, 
Jeremy, Clement, Ola, Bendick, Bee Ling, Stephanie, Kevin, Mingde, Anjana. Great 
conversations, great food, great games, great music, even better company. Extra thanks to 
Jason for all the generosity (read: vehicle) and deep discussions, be it on my thesis or 
whatever whetted our philosophical appetites. 
 
My spiritual family and other friends, especially those who kept asking, “How’s your 
thesis?” and giving me a headache trying to devise different sounding replies for the same 
answer. In particular (and no particular order): Ai Ling, Cheng Hung, Weihong, Xiaoling, 
Jia Xin, Ziling, Charmain, Jing Qiang, Kai En, Uncle James, and everyone in CYYAM 
who cared and/or prayed. 
 
And of course, my own family: Dad, Mum, Wei En and Xin En. Thanks for all the love 
and support. 
 
Soli Deo Gloria.   
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We often explain our actions in terms of our beliefs and desires. These beliefs and desires 
are often referred to as intentional mental states, i.e. mental states with contents that refer 
to something outside of themselves. There are two pertinent questions in the philosophy 
of mind regarding the nature of these intentional states and the kind of explanation that is 
involved when we appeal to them. The debates have been ongoing on 
a) Whether these intentional states are real and whether they truly explain 
anything; 
b) Whether these intentional states can be reduced to physical causes one way or 
another. 
In this thesis, I answer yes to (a) and no to (b). I will present original arguments defending 
the indispensability of intentional states in purposive explanations and their irreducibility 
to natural causes.  
 
In response to the question posed in (a), I shall argue that insofar as rational agents, our 
response to reasons must be explained by recourse to intentional states. I also argue 
against alternative views that deny this, either by denying intentional states altogether 
(eliminativism) or by denying their causal efficacy (semantic epiphenomenalism) qua 
intentionality. I show how these views are untenable upon further analysis. 
 
To the question in (b), I draw upon an intuitive principle involved in instrumental 
 vii 
rationality and employ it to show that intentional states cannot be reduced to physical 
causes. In particular, the modal properties of these intentional states differ from their 
supposed counterparts in physical causes when the principle is applied. Also, I provide 
further arguments against functionalism by showing how the normative aspect of 
rationality cannot be captured in causal analyses.  
 
If successful, these arguments have significant implications. As mentioned, the 
indispensability of intentional states in reasons-explanations renders eliminativism about 
intentional mental states and semantic epiphenomenalism false. On the other hand, the 
irreducibility of intentionality, together its indispensability, entails that physicalism 
(including identity theories and functionalism) is false.  
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- §1: Agents, Reasons and Causes - 
 
It is an indisputable fact that we find ourselves as agents interacting with the world we are 
in. It is nearly as certain that there are other agents like ourselves. It also seems obvious 
that we are rational agents. On our prima facie intuitions, people respond to reasons. We 
understand what it means to act, believe, and be motivated (and so on) for reasons.  
 
Also, and perhaps as such, reasons feature as explanations of intentional states and 
physical behavior. Frequently, we appeal to reasons as explanations of typical human 
thoughts and actions. To the question, “Why did you go for a swim?” one might reply, 
“Because I wanted to cool down.” In so replying, we intend for “wanting to cool down” 
to be an explanation for having a dip in the pool, and we understand “wanting to cool 
down” to provide a reason for having a dip in the pool.  
 
In view of this, reasons-explanations are sometimes known as purposive explanations, 
and for that reason, only rational agents can be said to do or believe anything for a reason. 
In the light of this, reasons-explanations often cite an agent’s intentional states themselves 
as elements that explain her motives, motivations, actions and other intentional states. A 
simple example frequently used is how a belief and desire can bring about motivation in 
an agent in a relevant way. For instance, Tom’s desire for a beer and his belief that he can 
obtain it by walking to the kitchen might explain his motivation to walk to the kitchen.  
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But reasons are not the only kinds of explanations that one can give of an event.1 In 
explaining events, we often appeal to causes as well. The book I release from my hand 
falls towards the ground, because (roughly speaking) a gravitational field acts on the mass 
of the book, accelerating it towards the earth. Thus gravity causes the book to fall to the 
ground. The sea breeze causes the palm trees to sway. My typing on the keyboard causes 
(by causing other events to cause) letters to appear on the computer screen. A needle prick 
on my finger causes me (by causing other events in the nervous system, etc. to cause me) 
to feel pain.  
 
Call these explanations causal-explanations. 2  The prevalence of both types of 
explanations in our lives has raised questions about how these types of explanations are 
related, as well as how their explanans, i.e. the reasons and causes being offered, fit into 
our scheme of reality. In this thesis, I wish to focus on the case of intentional states which 
feature as explanans of reasons-explanations, and their relation to physical causes. There 





                                                        
1
 By event, I mean roughly any instance of a state at a given time. Hence, the event of S being in neural state N 
at t does not necessarily mean that S came to be in N just at t. 
2
 In ordinary usage, people sometimes use the word “reason” in the way natural causes are defined in this paper. 
For example, when someone says, “What is the reason that the book fell?” they might mean to be asking for an 
answer such as “The law of gravity, together with other physical states relevant to the book.” But I shall reserve 
the usage of “reason” for resaons-explanations as defined above, i.e. as pertaining to rational agents alone. This 
does not preclude resaons from being causes.  
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- §1.1 The Substantive Question - 
 
The Substantive Question: Are reasons real? In claiming that we respond to reasons, we 
often presuppose that they are present in some way. We assume that there is in the world 
what Sellars calls “the logical space of reasons.”3 We might also believe that reasons 
affect the world, via agents that respond to them. Agents may respond to reasons by 
believing, desiring, having certain affective states, and acting. Moreover, intentional 
states are often cited as reasons themselves by simply naming the type of intentional state 
(e.g. a desire) and its content (e.g. to get a beer). Now these presuppositions may seem so 
clear as to be beyond reasonable dispute; however, this is not the case given certain 
metaphysical theses about the world.  
 
Epiphenomenalism, for example, holds that mental states qua mental have no effect on 
the physical world at all. Now since human behavior is physical, it follows that mental 
states have no effect on our behavior in virtue of them being mental.4 Thus if reasons are 
non-identical with and irreducible to physical causes or entities, then reasons do not get 
any hold on the physical world at all, and we do not act for any reasons. 
Epiphenomenalism is often motivated by certain related theses about the physical world, 
for example, that physical causes completely determine physical effects or that some law 
of conservation (e.g. of energy) holds within closed physical systems. Taken together with 
                                                        
3
 Sellars, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” 298-9. 
4
 I take physical here to be identical to the natural, or a subset of it. And by the natural world, I mean the entities 
and the laws that determine their casual relations as elucidated in natural science, especially Physics. To borrow 
a phrase from Mcdowell, the physical belongs to the “realm of law.” 
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the proposition that reasons are irreducible to causes, such theses seem to lead to reasons 
having no grip on the physical world at all.  
 
This problem is familiar in philosophy of mind – even if mental states are somehow 
physical, reducible to the physical, or supervenient on the physical, their semantic 
properties, i.e. their meaningful content, may have no causal relevance whatsoever to 
behavior. Many attempts have been made to secure for these semantic properties of 
mental states a foothold on the physical world, with mixed success.5 These semantic 
properties are precisely reasons of a certain sort – considerations from the agent’s point of 
view weighing in favor of certain motivations and actions.6 For example, the desire to do 
well on an exam and the belief that hard work is the best way to achieve it recommend to 
the agent that she should work hard.  
 
More radical views hold that such reasons do not exist. Eliminativism and nihilism about 
mental/psychological states or their intentionality are examples of such views.  
 
In response to the Substantive Question, I want to argue that the presence of reasons and 
their efficacy in relation to actions are the last notions that we should give up. I will be 
arguing that the reality and efficacy of the content of intentional states should be upheld. 
But before launching into the arguments proper in the next Chapter, let’s have a look at 
                                                        
5
 It appears that success only comes upon accepting a fully reductive account of the intentionality of mental 
states to physical states and/or their causal relations, e.g. by embracing some type-identity thesis or analytic 
functionalism. For an insightful discussion on this, see Crane, “The Mental Causation Debate.” 
6
 It might be more accurate to say that these states “provide reasons,” rather than that they are reasons in 
themselves. This would be a better way of putting things just in case we disagree with Davidson that “the 
primary reason for an action is its cause.” See Davidson, “Actions, Reasons and Causes.” 
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the second question. 
 
 
- §1.2 The Conceptual Question - 
 
The Conceptual Question: Can reasons be reduced to causes? More specifically, can 
intentionality be subsumed under some physical causes or functional analysis? This is a 
question of whether reasons-explanations are a type of causal-explanations. According to 
naturalistic views, reasons are just causes in one way or another.  
 
To this question, I wish to give the answer ‘no’. I will argue that intentional states cannot 
be reduced to physical causes in Chapter 3. 
 
That intentional states cannot be reduced to physical causes is to be distinguished from 
the claim that intentional states are not causes per se, in the sense that they do not 
contribute to events in any way. The latter claim means that no event ever happens 
because of some intentional state - that explanations of events (including actions of agents) 
need never appeal to intentional states. The former claim, however, entails that if 
intentionality does feature in explanations, then some aspects of explanations are 
non-physical. If complete explanations of certain events (particularly regarding agents) 
necessarily invoke intentionality, then explanations from physical causes alone are 
insufficient for such events. 
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My response to these two questions, if successful, would have significant implications for 
the philosophy of mind. If our intentional states are real and efficacious, and cannot be 
reduced to physical causes, then certain positions are ruled out. On the one hand, the 
indispensability of intentional states in reasons-explanations renders eliminativism about 
intentional mental states and semantic epiphenomenalism false. On the other hand, the 
irreducibility of intentionality, together with its indispensability, entails that physicalism 
(including identity theories and functionalism) is false.  
 
The following argument will serve to highlight what is at stake: 
 
S1. If an event happens because (at least in part) of some intentional state, then an 
explanation of that event should include that state.  
 
S2. Intentional states cannot be reduced to physical causes. 
 
S3. Thus, if an explanation involves intentional states, some aspect of that 
explanation is non-physical.7  
 
S4. Hence, if an event happens because (at least in part) of some intentional state, 
                                                        
7
 There is a related debate on whether intentional states cause other events qua their content, or whether the 
intentionality of the intentional state is relevant to an explanation of an event. I take it to be true that when an 
explanation necessarily appeals an intentional state, it does so such that the intentionality of the intentional state 
is relevant to the explanation.  
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then some aspect of an explanation of that event must be non-physical.  
 
S5. Some events happen (at least in part) due to intentional states. 
 
S6. Hence, some aspects of explanations of events are non-physical. 
 
S1, S2 and S5 are independent premises. I shall take S1 to be true without argument, 
assuming that overdetermination is ruled out. S5 is a substantive claim about intentional 
states and their role in the actual world, and I will argue for it in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, 
my concern will be with S2, which is the conceptual claim. The formulation highlights 
the significance of S2. If the conclusion of this argument is true, then physicalist accounts 
of the world are false, since there are some events which can only be explained by 
(irreducibly) non-physical facts. 
 
Having surveyed the playing field, my arguments for the indispensability of reasons 
commence in the next chapter. 
 8 
- §2 The Indispensability of Reasons - 
 
To begin with, it is necessary to first distinguish between what Bernard Williams calls 
“internal reasons” and “external reasons.”8 I shall then argue separately that we should 
not give up either conception of reasons as necessary aspects of explanations of human 
behavior. I draw this distinction because I believe that arguing for both kinds of reasons 
makes life more difficult for the epiphenomenalist. An epiphenomenalist, in denying the 
efficacy of mental states, in particular denies any causal or explanatory role for the 
intentionality of these states. One good argument against this latter denial can be made 
from accepting that we respond to the world in a rational way, i.e., that we respond to 
external reasons. However, some may deny that there are external reasons. I will argue 
that external reasons do influence action, albeit indirectly. In particular, since many who 
deny the relevance of external reasons accept internal reasons explanations, I shall also 
argue that for any conception of internal reasons explanation to make sense, at least some 
external reasons must be presupposed. This is one way, I suggest, to see how external 
reasons become relevant to actions. 
 
And independently, it seems that internal reasons are necessary for explanation of actions 
as well. Thus, even if the argument from external reasons is rejected, the 
epiphenomenalist will have to contend with the sheer force of our ordinary explanations 
that invoke internal reasons. Finally, I make some remarks on why reasons are 
                                                        
8
 Williams, “Internal and External Reasons,” 363.  
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indispensable to explanations in general, and the philosophical enterprise as a whole.  
 
 
- §2.1: Internal and External Reasons - 
 
As Williams notes, when we say  
 
(A) “S has a reason to X” (where X could mean performing an action or holding a 
belief) 
 
we might mean it such that (A) is false if the statement 
 
(1) S has some desire which would be served by X-ing 
 
is false.9 Here, I will take the term “desires” in the broad sense, i.e. to mean “desires and 
any other pro-attitudes that may be found in S’ subjective motivational set.” Williams 
defines an agent’s “subjective motivational set” as the set which contains not only his 
desires (taken in the narrow sense) but also “dispositions of evaluation, patterns of 
emotional reaction, personal loyalties, and various projects, as they may be abstractly 
                                                        
9
 Williams is primarily concerned with reasons for action. I am thus modifying his definitions. Henceforth, I 
will take the term “desires” in the broad sense explained below, i.e. to mean “desires and any other pro-attitudes 
that may be found in S.” For present purposes, I shall assume that pro-attitudes do not include beliefs, although 
we could have beliefs about the kinds of pro-attitudes we should have. On some accounts, moral beliefs may 
function very much like pro-attitudes, but nothing in this paper hinges on whether such a view is accepted. 
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called, embodying commitments of the agent.”10 Also, to say that “S has some desire” 
means, strictly speaking, that “S has some desire that is either currently present or 
derivable from other desires that he has currently”. With these qualifications in place, this 
first interpretation of (A) is basically a sophisticated Humean account of instrumental 
reason. So then, desires taken in this broad sense are a necessary condition for an agent to 
be construed as having a reason for action. Although Williams does not mention that they 
are a sufficient condition, I shall take it that whenever these desires are present in an agent, 
this view in question (i.e. the internal reasons view) considers that the agent has a pro 
tanto reason to act so as to satisfy those desires. Reasons, in this account, are basically 
what agents are concerned about, what matters to them. Following Williams, we shall call 
them “internal reasons.”11  
 
On the other hand, we might intend (A) to mean that  
 
(2) There is something that counts in favor of A’s X-ing that is independent of 
whether (1) is true.   
 
On (2), facts or properties “in the world” (and not our subjective dispositions) are what 
                                                        
10
 Williams, “Internal and External Reasons,” 366.  
11
 As stated above, the quotes from Williams ((A) and (1)) do not add up to a proper definition of “internal 
reason.” Williams provides only a necessary condition for the truth of (A), namely, that (1) be true. However, it 
is difficult to give a proper definition of reason that is not circular. As Scanlon remarks in What We Owe to Each 
Other (p.17), “I will take the idea of a reason as primitive.” Scanlon has a good reason to take the idea of reason 
as something that cannot be helpfully explained in terms of other concepts. What it is to be a reason for 
something, he says, is just “a consideration that counts in favor of it.” But “counts in favor” here cannot be 
explained further except to invoke the idea of having a reason again. As Parfit notes (in “Normativity”, 
330-331), “normative concepts cannot be explained in non-normative terms. ...And, when we ask why there are 
such truths, or what makes them true, the most that we can do is to explain some of these truths by appealing to 
others. We soon reach truths for which we can give no further explanation.” 
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give us reasons. The facts about (or properties of) suffering, for example, give us a reason, 
ceteris paribus, to prevent or relieve it, independent of how we are actually disposed to 
deal with cases of suffering. In other words, certain things matter, not just in the sense 
that we are concerned about them.12 On such views, reasons are objective in the sense 
that they exist independently in a distinctive category - as normative truths.13 On this 
account, given that S (or anyone else) has a reason to relieve the acute suffering of a 
fellow human being as far as she is able to, she has a reason to do so regardless of her 
personal desires and concerns. Call these “external reasons.”  
 
With these concepts in place, I shall argue that both internal and external reasons are 
indispensable to explanations of human behavior. 
 
 
- §2.2: Why External Reasons Matter - 
 
First, external reasons. Since my target is epiphenomenalism about reasons, the aim is 
ultimately to show that external reasons are relevant to action. But I will first discuss 
reasons for belief, and then argue that beliefs are relevant to action. Consider the 
following cases: 
 
                                                        
12
 See Parfit, “Normativity”, 325-330. 
13
 Ibid., 330-332. On 331, Parfit notes, “Normative concepts form a fundamental category – like, say, temporal 
or logical concepts. […] If there are normative truths, these are of a distinctive kind, which we should not 
expect to be like ordinary, natural truths. “ 
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Modus Ponens. Green believes the following two propositions: “P” and “If P, then 
Q.” She has a reason to believe that Q. 
 
Reliable sense perception. White perceives a rose out in the garden in the day under 
normal conditions. White has reason to believe that there is a rose in the garden. 
 
Induction. Each of the last 100 times Red touched a hot object, she felt pain. Red has 
reason to believe that the next time she touches a hot object, she will feel pain.  
 
Two things should be intuitive. First, the statements in italics are true.14 Second, the truth 
of the statements does not depend at all on the desires (or motivational states) of the 
agents involved. Basic intuitions aside, there is much debate on what exactly justifies, 
warrants, or grounds beliefs satisfactorily. But these various theories in epistemology 
should not distract us from seeing what is obvious, namely, that reasons for belief depend 
on facts about the world. Even when it is not clear exactly which general principle (if any) 
it is in virtue of which a subject is justified, it is often clear which are the cases in which a 
subject does believe well or believe rightly.15 And in such cases we recognize that the 
subjects have good reasons to believe, whether or not they know those reasons, and 
                                                        
14
 That the statements are true does not entail that the agent’s beliefs should always be in accordance to those 
reasons. For these reasons are defeasible, pro tanto reasons that could be trumped by stronger reasons in the 
final analysis, given the whole picture.   
15
 I shall use the word “justification” to include “justification, warrant, grounds” and whatever is needed for 
knowledge over and above true belief. The different theories on what makes a belief justified include 
foundationalism, coherentism, reliabilism, proper functionalism and so on. 
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regardless of how they feel about those reasons.16  
 
But the mere existence of these external, subject-independent reasons isn’t enough to 
secure their relevance to our actions. First off, the question is whether we do respond to 
such reasons by believing in accordance with (external) reasons’ dictates. It seems that 
there are many instances in which our beliefs do in fact respond to external reasons. For 
example, consider 
 
Engineering Problem. Blue’s task as an engineer is to determine which valve (A, B 
or C) in the plant is malfunctioning. The valves and their indicators all look similar. 
Blue rightly deduces that the only way for him to achieve his task is to solve a 2nd 
order differential equation on fluid dynamics using data from each valve as boundary 
conditions. Blue subsequently solves the equation correctly and acquires the belief 
that valve A is the malfunctioning valve. When asked why he believes so, he replies, 
“Oh, because I performed such-and-such calculations and obtained such-and-such 
results. And these results indicate that valve A is faulty because the plant is supposed 
to function in such-and-such a way.” 
 
Such cases are common enough. It seems intuitive that Blue’s belief that valve A is the 
malfunctioning valve is indeed in response to reasons that obtained because of certain 
facts, e.g. about fluid dynamics, mathematics and the state of the plant. Take a simple step 
                                                        
16
 Of course, there could be some cases whereby knowing the reasons for belief contributes to justification of 
that belief. The epistemological internalist might hold that knowing some reason or grounds for belief is 
necessary for justification. But that is not the focus here.  
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of the solution for instance – adding the numbers 1532 and 1264. Blue looks at the 
numbers, scribbles down some calculations, and ends up with 2796, which is correct. Is 
there any reason for Blue to believe that the answer is indeed 2796? Surely, the very fact 
that 1532+1264=2796, together with other facts about his own ability to perform 
numerical addition. And there could be further reasons for him to choose a certain method 
to arrive at the belief that the answer is 2796, due to facts about efficient and correct ways 
to add numbers. And Blue is responding to these reasons (perhaps unconsciously, as this 
has already become a habit) in arriving at his beliefs. More generally, as evidenced by his 
reply (typical of such replies, I think), he cites such facts to provide reasons for his belief 
that valve A is malfunctioning. The natural and charitable response, I take it, is to simply 
take his word for it. And this is what we as rational, functioning adult human beings 
usually take other people’s explanations to mean. Take this as the Case for External 
Reasons. 
 
But charity aside, one could offer up two objections to the Case for External Reasons. 
The first is the Causal Objection: “You say that Blue is responding to reasons. But why 
can’t it be the case that he is merely responding to causes? Perhaps all that is happening is 
Blue responding to inputs from his environment and, via some causal process, forming 
(among other mental states) the belief that valve A is malfunctioning.” Second, the 
Internalist Objection: I have in mind the reasons internalist who says: “What is really 
 15 
happening is not that Blue is responding to any external reasons or facts.17 What is 
relevant to his formation of new beliefs and desires are his current beliefs - e.g. beliefs 
about what numerals mean, about mathematics, valves, language and so on - as well as 
his current desires – e.g. the desire to solve the problem before doing anything else.” I 




- §2.2.1 The Causal Objection Considered - 
 
As stated above, the objector claims that Blue’s beliefs and actions in response to the 
Engineering Problem is merely a response to causes.  
 
Once again, there are two ways this objection can be taken: 
 
(1) Blue’s beliefs about his environment, his subsequent mental states, and his 
actions are accounted for only by natural causes.18 
(2) Blue’s beliefs about his environment, his subsequent mental states, and his 
actions are accounted for fully by natural causes. 
 
                                                        
17
 I.e., By ‘internalist’, I refer to someone who hold that there are only internal reasons, or that only internal 
reasons matter in explaining an agent’s psychological states, motivation and action. Not to be confused with 
internalism about justification. 
18
 By natural causes, I mean causes that are instantiations of natural laws such as the laws of physics. 
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The first claim amounts to a denial of there being any external reasons that explain Blue’s 
mental states and actions. On this view, all that Blue comes to believe about his 
environment in response to his sensory inputs (such as seeing the valves, hearing and 
seeing his technician report a fault in one of the valves, seeing the figures on his computer, 
etc.), as well as his subsequent mental states (such as the interactions of his beliefs and 
desires, the formation of new beliefs and desires, his decision to follow some course of 
action and his trying to do so, etc.) and actions, can be completely explained by causes 
acting in accordance with natural laws. Furthermore, this explanation rules out any other 
explanation, in particular, an explanation that appeals to external reasons. Why hold this? 
Some might want to claim that once there is a complete explanation of any event, there 
cannot be any other explanation of that event that is independent of the original one. And 
if we want to hold that external reasons are not causes, then once there is a complete 
causal explanation, there cannot be an external reasons explanation.  
 
The second claim is similar to the first in asserting that Blue’s mental states and actions 
are fully explained by causes. This is a functionalist claim that does not necessarily rule 
out reasons explanations.19 We shall leave (2) for the time being, since I will argue in the 
next chapter that (2) is false, and more importantly, because its truth would not make a 
difference to the thesis in this section. For even if there is a correct functionalist account 
of mental states, it does not mean that these states do not constitute reasons for an agent’s 
                                                        
19
 I will argue later that these functionalist claims are in fact false. See §3 on The Irreducibility of Intentionality. 
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action.20 If reasons are causes, then a reasons-explanation is not independent of a causal 
explanation; hence reasons explanations are not ruled out. As such, we can ignore (2) for 
the time being. 
 
As for dealing with (1), I would argue that causal explanations alone cannot completely 
explain Blue’s case. One may wonder how this is different from simply arguing that 
external reasons cannot be reduced to causes. If that were the case, the eliminativist could 
simply deny that there are external reasons. But that would be to misconstrue the shape of 
the debate. For I first presented the account of the Engineering Problem (as well as the 
brief examples beforehand) as an instance of what we call reasoning that is present in 
everyday, actual cases. I take it that the eliminativist would not want to deny outright that 
these cases occur. Rather, I believe that the eliminativist would want to say that we are 
mistaken that these cases are true cases of reasoning, namely because they are just causal 
processes one way or another. As such, on showing that causal processes cannot account 
for these purported cases of reasoning, I am not merely arguing that Blue’s response to 
external reasons (as a concept) cannot be reduced to causes, I am arguing our actual cases 
of reasoning with external reasons cannot be reduced to causes. The latter, if true, would 
rule out eliminativism, since what the argument aims to do, in effect, is to show that the 
purported cases of reasoning are indeed cases of reasoning.  
 
So then, why claim that causal explanations are insufficient to account for Blue’s case?  
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 To wit, if a successful reduction of reasons to causes is possible, then the causal explanation does not rule out 
the relevance of external reasons.  
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Firstly, understanding and interpretation of these images is crucial to arriving at beliefs 
about the plant. It seems doubtful that a causal account of ‘sensation to belief’ could be 
given in this case. A whole lot of background information is critical here: facts about 
mathematical theories, engineering conventions, a particular language, and so on. We 
cannot ignore the holistic nature of the meanings of statements such as “The liquid 
passing valve A exhibits turbulent behavior.” If Blue believes this statement, he must also 
believe many other propositions about valves, turbulence, liquids, mathematics, fluid 
dynamics, propositions describing a general scientific worldview, and so on. Thus, it is 
hard to see how a causal account of particular belief could be given – since having a 
certain belief presupposes having a whole lot of other beliefs and concepts. There are 
deep issues about language and concepts here that we cannot go into. But I think the onus 
is on the objector who claims (1) to overcome these difficulties. At first glance, they seem 
rather insurmountable.  
 
But it might be claimed that it is unfair for us to use a complex belief such as the one 
above as an example against a causal account. Perhaps, the objector might say, we should 
not start with such complex beliefs. Sure, there is no account currently available for such 
beliefs in terms of natural causes; that does not imply that there won’t be any in future 
when causal accounts are better developed. So then, let’s take a simple belief, for example, 
the belief that there is a red object in front of me. To have such a belief, one must still 
believe in objects, one must have the concept of colour, and the concept of spatial 
 19 
relations between objects (such that the red object is ‘in front’ of one), not to mention, 
possibly, the concept of my ‘self’. The possession of such concepts implies that one at 
least believes (regardless of whether one consciously judges) that objects have colours, 
and occupy space, and so on.21 And one could not be truly said to have a concept of red, 
unless one knew something about what distinguishes red from blue, green and other 
colours. Similarly, we would not say that someone has the concept of an object unless he 
could make some distinction between the object and himself. 
 
The point then, is not so much the complexity of beliefs, but rather the holistic nature of 
beliefs.22 Even simple beliefs do not stand alone. It is hard to conceive of someone who 
only believes a single proposition. If that is true, then any analysis of a single belief must 
necessarily involve other beliefs. This does not seem to be a contingent fact about our 
psychology, since it seems to be true merely from an analysis of beliefs. Rather, it 
involves certain constraints inherent in the meaning of what it is to believe that p or to 
desire that p. To believe that p involves understanding p and any concept within p. And as 
Davidson remarks,  
 
“Many concepts are fairly directly connected, through causality, with the world, but 
they would not be the concepts they are without their connections with other 
concepts, and without relations to other concepts, they would not be concepts.”23 
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 For an extended critique, see Putnam, Representation and Reality.  
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 The point applies to desires and other mental states with content as well. Insofar as these states have 
propositional content, they involve the possession by the subject of the relevant concepts, if the subject is to be 
in those states.  
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 Davidson, “What Thought Requires,” 137. 
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Hence, to give a causal account of the event of coming to have a belief p, one needs to 
presuppose other concepts. And to understand the concepts inherent in p, one needs to 
understand and believe certain other propositions, of which accounts have to be given. 
But since no one concept is independent of other concepts, there is no causal account of 
any single belief. What about causal accounts of a set of interconnected beliefs? I have no 
knockdown proof that this is not possible, however, my guess it that it would be very 
difficult to demarcate a set of beliefs whose constituent concepts bear no relation to other 
concepts at all. And as such sets get bigger, the possibility of any useful analysis 
decreases drastically. And obviously, it wouldn’t be useful at all to analyze all my beliefs 
at once. For it is the individual beliefs that stand in need of explanation. If all we had was 
an account of all beliefs, the account would do nothing to distinguish between the 
intentional state of having a belief that p and the intentional state of having a belief that q.  
 
But suppose there were indeed causal analyses of belief-sets. What would such accounts 
explain about individual beliefs? Again, if individual beliefs could only be explained in 
by appealing to other beliefs, then it seems that the account would still be incomplete. 
Such an account would not be successfully reductive. 
 
Secondly and more importantly, a conscious understanding of the situation and the 
relevant concepts seems to be at the heart of Blue’s response. Once such an understanding 
is present, the reasons for belief ‘recommend’ themselves, as it were. There is a normative 
 21 
factor that is crucial to explanation here: if you understand that these symbols indicate 
some malfunction, you should believe that there is some malfunction. If we put ourselves 
in Blue’s situation, our explanation for our beliefs will involve our understanding of what 
the problem is, what mathematical concepts we are dealing with, and so on. And given all 
these, we just see that we should believe. This is our response to the normativity of 
external reasons. And when we hear others give such explanations, we take it that they are 
responding likewise. 
 
Here, I am not claiming that something like a (unconscious) robot or a zombie could not 
have behaved as Blue did, i.e. receive the same sensory inputs and behave in the same 
way (or have the same beliefs).24  What I claim is that for ordinary rational humans, that 
is not the right kind of explanation to offer, at least not as a complete explanation. And the 
basis for this claim is that we do know how it is from the inside - when we see the 
symbols “1532,” “+,” and so on, we do know what they mean, what quantity they refer to 
and the objects being quantified, and we consciously think about what to do given such 
data. We do not find ourselves merely “caused” to have certain beliefs just by receiving 
certain inputs. This is not to say that reasons do not play a part in causing us to have 
certain beliefs - that they are not causes in any sense of the word. The target here is a 
completely physicalistic account of our response to the world that claims to be the only 
explanation of our behavior, in which everything happens in accordance to antecedent 
causes operating under natural laws, that rules out a response to the normative element 
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 Whether they could “believe” in the way we believe is doubtful. Certainly, the phenomenal aspect is absent. 
As to what difference this makes to the content and justification of the beliefs, I have no space to address here.  
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present in the content of those reasons. That, I claim, is not how we explain things. 
 
The point becomes clearer when we consider an atypical case where we simply find 
ourselves in Blue’s situation to begin with:  
 
Engineering Problem 2: We realize there is a valve problem, we see the data inputs 
and hear the technician’s report, and so on. But unlike Blue, we have no knowledge 
of fluid dynamics, how the plant and the valves work, and our understanding of 
mathematics stops at basic arithmetic. Yet subsequent to receiving the sensory inputs, 
we find our hands scribbling numbers on paper without our having decided to do so. 
Following that, we find ourselves looking at the answers to some complex 
calculations without understanding how they are arrived at. Finally, we find 
ourselves simply believing that valve A is malfunctioning. Now, if we were 
questioned in this scenario, there is simply no rational explanation available. Asked 
why we believe that valve A is malfunctioning, we could not offer any reasons. If 
asked how we arrived at the answers to the calculations, we would not know what to 
say, except that our hands seemed to react to the sensory inputs and started moving 
across the paper.  
 
What’s the difference in this case? I think we should say of the above scenario that we 
understand neither our belief that valve A is malfunctioning, nor the actions we perform 
to arrive at the belief. In such a case, it is clear that the objection expressed in (1) would 
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be true. In short, no rational, purposive explanation can be given for our belief about 
valve A. Our beliefs and actions can be accounted for only by natural causes.25  There is 
a clear difference between this kind of atypical case, and the normal cases in which we 
encounter situations like the original Engineering Problem. And yet for such an atypical 
case, whatever causal analysis which we gave for Blue would apply just as well.  
 
The reason for this is as follows. In the examples being compared, the sensory inputs 
Blue encounters and his resulting behavior are exactly the same. As such, the only way 
for the causal states to differ is for Blue’s brain to process them differently.26 However, it 
seems that we can always modify the example to exclude this. So then, suppose that there 
are 2 agents, Blue 1 and Blue 2, whose brains are physically identical and which received 
the exact same inputs. Blue 1 is the agent from our Engineering Problem considered 
earlier. Blue 2, on the other hand, lives in some other possible world. Blue 2’s situation, 
as you might guess, is the one described in Engineering Problem 2. Moreover, Blue 2’s 
brain undergoes the same causal processes as Blue 1’s brain does. Given these 
stipulations, whatever causal account we give of Blue’s case, it would seemingly apply to 
the atypical case as well. And it does seem that cases like Blue 2’s are logically possible. 
But what, one may ask, is exactly missing from Blue 2’s case? What is this understanding 
that we lack? Without a clear idea, our intuitions on whether Blue 2’s case is logically 
possible might run afoul.  
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 Or at least, it is clear that if there’s any rational, purposive explanation, it has nothing to do with us. Perhaps 
God caused me to have the belief, given that it was appropriate for me to have the belief under the 
circumstances. But it would not be me that responded to any external reason. 
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 The brain is meant to be taken as a purely physical organ. Whether mental states are brain states is a further 




In response to this worry, let us generalize the case and pick out the relevant concept of 
‘understanding’. For cases akin to the original Engineering Problem, where we seem to 
reason our way to certain beliefs and courses of action, we could always construct a 
thought experiment where all the causal and physical events that happen are identical to 
the normal cases, but where we felt we could not understand the rationale for our beliefs 
and actions.  
 
Such cases include constructing a philosophical argument, making a defense in court, 
figuring out where best to park the car in the city, and so on. Insofar as they are judged to 
be appropriate cases of reasoning to conclusions, they seem to share certain 
characteristics, including:  
 
(i) Acting on a desire to find out some facts. 
(ii) Coming to believe some propositions which are supposedly the facts in (i). 
(iii) Directly understanding the reasonableness of the beliefs in (ii). 
(iv) Conforming to minimal rationality constraints. 
 
Let us grant that (i) is completely amenable to a causal analysis. This leaves us with (ii), 
(iii) and (iv). The rationality constraints in (iv) need further explication, and I touch on 
this later in this work.27 I wish to focus on the “direct understanding” in (iii). Were we in 
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 See §3 on The Irreducibility of Intentionality. 
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Engineering Problem 2, we would not really understand what was going on. We would 
not be able to justify our belief that valve A is malfunctioning. And were we, in addition 
to having that belief, to find ourselves uttering strings of words to others upon being 
questioned, words that in ordinary language describe plausible reasons to others on why 
we thought so, those would not be our reasons. Reflecting on this and other similar cases, 
we find that insofar as we think of ourselves as responding to reasons, we are able to 
provide reasons, first to ourselves, why we believed and did something. And obviously, 
“providing reasons” does not entail any overt form of verbalizing or writing. Nor does 
such behavior imply that that we are providing reasons.28 Rather, providing reasons to 
ourselves is something akin to explaining to ourselves why we come to have a belief or 
perform an action. As such, I propose the following necessary condition of ‘direct 
understanding’ that is implicit in (iii): 
 
Principle of Direct Understanding (PDU): S directly understands a belief or an action 
only if there is an explanation of that belief or action that is accessible to S in a way 
that is not possible for those without the direct understanding.29 (Call this kind of 
explanations uniquely accessible.) 
 
For suppose, just at the very moment I wish to tell you my reason for believing or doing 
X, I am suddenly unable to speak or move any part of my body. I could still very well 
                                                        
28
 Obviously, someone could give apparent reasons for his action, merely by producing a string of words that 
we take to be a reason. A robot could be programmed to do that without being aware of what is happening. But 
this cannot be true from our first person perspective, as said in the preceding paragraph. 
29
 Note that this is not true of intentional states such as beliefs and desires. For it is arguably possible for me to 
have a belief without identifying that I do have that belief even upon reflection. Similarly, I could have 
unconscious desires. 
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provide the reason to myself just by thinking of it. So then, others might have full 
information regarding the explanation, but if they do, it is only through my letting them 
know, or perhaps through some highly advanced brain scan. These are avenues of which I 
can avail myself as well. But I have a more direct way, namely, just by introspecting my 
reasons for believing or doing X. Note that it is not the case that others do not have that 
sort of introspective access due to some facts peculiar to this description. It is simply 
impossible for them to have that sort of introspective access to the reasons involved.  
 
If this is true, it explains the intuition that Blue 2’s case is logically possible. This is 
because there is nothing in causal accounts that can capture the necessary condition of 
direct understanding as spelt out in (PDU). Causal explanations are essentially 
explanations from the third-person perspective – all we need to know are what physical 
states there are and how they are causally related. It could be objected that it is the causal 
configuration that gives special access to the subject that is having the direct 
understanding. But given any causal configuration, why should that configuration give 
unique access to a particular subject? Note that the claim is not merely that other subjects 
do not have this special access – it is that they cannot possibly have this sort of access.  
 
Recalling the examples of Blue 1 and Blue 2, it should not be surprising that two cases in 




At this point, I leave it open whether this direct understanding is essentially a 
phenomenological state – if it is, then arguments typically given for the irreducibility of 
phenomenal states such as the knowledge argument and zombie arguments can be applied 
as well.30 If not, (PDU) itself is enough to entail the irreducibility. As such, it is not 
pertinent to our purposes that we determine whether the direct understanding referred to 
is phenomenological or not. 
 
It might be suggested, though, that this “direct understanding” is just a second- (or higher) 
order belief about first order beliefs, or simply some first order beliefs about our 
motivations and actions. I am not sure what to say about this; however, I think that even if 
direct understanding consisted of beliefs of some sort, then these beliefs must satisfy 
(PDU). In other words, these beliefs have to be directly introspectible to the agent and 
function as explanations of the first-order beliefs or actions. So the foregoing arguments 
would apply as well. 
 
All that is left for the defender of external reasons to do is to claim that cases like Blue’s 
case are typical of us, and that the atypical case really is atypical of ordinary human 
reasoning. Such atypical cases clearly run afoul of our ordinary reasoning leading to 
beliefs. Now recall the context of the debate. The Engineering Problem illustrates what is 
intuitively a case of response to external reasons. Against this, one may object that Blue’s 
beliefs about his environment, his subsequent mental states, and his actions are accounted 
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 Some might want to argue that the only kind of state that satisfies (B) is a phenomenological state. Such 
arguments would happily supplement my claims. 
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for only by natural causes. This objection could be backed by claiming that reasons 
cannot be reduced to causes (which I hold as well), and that causal explanations are 
complete explanations.31 Since I have shown that Blue’s case cannot be completely 
explained by causes, I have also removed the motivation behind the eliminativist claim 
about external reasons. (Incidentally, this is also an argument for the claim that intentional 
states are irreducible to causes. For Blue’s response to external reasons is precisely 
constituted by the kind of beliefs and motivations that he forms as a result.) 
 
This is not to say that we never find ourselves coming to have beliefs for which we could 
not give good reasons. That might be the case sometimes, as (arguably) in the case of 
sense perception. But not always. When the beliefs get more complex and interpretation 
of representations are involved, we do consciously reason our way to beliefs. Neither is it 
to say that we never err in thinking that we have good reasons for having certain beliefs. 
Nor does (PDU) exclude any room for error in understanding. For we might think that we 
form a belief for one reason when really we form it for another reason, or no reason at all. 
Such instances, however, would be consistent with (PDU) – all (PDU) claims is that we 
have this subjective explanation uniquely accessible. We could, if we like, further 
distinguish between different types of direct understanding: the objective sort, where what 
we understand to be our reasons are truly the reasons for which we believed or acted, and 
the subjective sort, where what we understand to be our reasons for acting are simply the 
type of reasons that feature in explanations that have the property of being uniquely 
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 And assuming some exclusion principle, e.g. Once there is a complete explanation E of any event, there 
cannot be any other explanation of that event that is independent of E. 
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accessible to us.32 
 
What the imagined scenario shows is the importance of the first-person perspective in 
purposive explanations. While epiphenomenalism with respect to external reasons may be 
plausible to some extent from the third-person point of view, we can see that it is not true 
from our own case.33 If you envisage the norms of rationality as laws you can look up in 
a rule book, then they under-specify rational behavior, because there is always the case of 
accidentally ‘abiding by the rules’. Not only do we think and act according the norms of 
rationality, we think and act rationally, that is, we act because of reasons. And whether 
we do so might only be clear to ourselves. But it is clear enough: our rational behavior is 
not secured in some roundabout way via causes operating on our psychological states, to 
which the reasons have no direct relevance. As I have claimed, our rational behavior 
involves (at least sometimes) response to external reasons. And all this means is that we 
do respond rationally to the way the world is.  
 
As to how exactly external reasons enter into our deliberative processes, I have little to 
say in this paper. The claim here is only that external reasons as defined are relevant to 
how we form beliefs. And clearly, our beliefs are relevant to our actions. For it is easy to 
think of cases like 
 
Fridge A. I was hungry. I walked to the kitchen because I believed the fridge 
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 And obviously, these two types of direct understanding may overlap, in cases where the subjective kind is 
veridical. 
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 E.g. cases of accidentally true beliefs or accidentally justified beliefs. 
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contained food. If I had not believed that the fridge contained food, I would not have 
walked to the kitchen,  
 
Fridge B. I was hungry. I did not walk to the kitchen because I did not believe that 
the fridge contained food. If I had believed that the fridge contained food, I would 
have walked to the kitchen. 
 
Thus, if external reasons are relevant to how we form beliefs, then external reasons are 
relevant to our actions.  
 
 
- §2.2.2 Interlude: External Practical Reasons - 
 
Before I go on to the second objection, I would like to briefly mention external reasons 
for action, i.e. external practical reasons. On some views, we have reasons to act in 
certain ways that are independent of our desires.34 Some theorists, for example, take it to 
be true simpliciter that  
 
(B) We have reason to relieve the suffering of others. 
 
That is to say, in ordinary language, we should do it whether we like it or not. (B) is 
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 Recall that this is taken in the broad sense stipulated in note 7.  
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usually seen as a special type of reason – a moral claim. But there are also other plausible, 
non-moral practical reasons, prudential reasons, to be exact. For example, it might be 
claimed that,  
 
 (C) Everyone has reason to take care of his own well-being.  
 
Now, there have been many doubts about whether reason could have such content as 
claimed in (B) and (C); “whether “formal” principles have any content and can give 
substantive guidance to choice and action.”35 I am not here to argue that there are indeed 
external reasons for action36; rather, for those who are persuaded of the relevance of such 
practical reason claims on us, I offer up an additional consideration in favor of external 
reasons. Namely, if you believe some practical (external) reason claim like (B) or (C), you 
think that such claims do influence or can influence at least some people at certain times, 
and that they are categorical claims – i.e. they hold independent of whether the subject 
has any pro-attitude towards what they recommend, then we have another argument to 
external reasons affect behavior.  
 
 
- §2.2.3: The Internalist Objection Considered - 
 
Now for the second objection to the Case for External Reasons. In defending external 
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 Korsgaard, “Skepticism about Practical Reason,” 5. 
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 Indeed, to attempt such a task would be to venture deep into the realms of meta-ethics.  
 32 
reasons against this objection, I also argue that any reasonable theory of internal reasons 
presupposes external reasons. For this objection, I have in view the (reasons) internalist 
who says: “What is really happening is not that Blue is responding to any external reasons 
or facts. What is relevant to his formation of new beliefs and desires are his current 
beliefs - e.g. beliefs about what numerals mean, about mathematics, valves, language and 
so on - as well as his current desires – e.g. the desire to solve the problem before doing 
anything else. When Blue says that he X-ed because of some “reason,” what really 
happened is that he X-ed because of his belief that there was some reason to X,37 and not 
because of the reason itself. And the same goes for his actions – they are explained by his 
beliefs and desires.” 
 
This objection basically claims that all purposive explanations should invoke only 
existing mental states instead of some reasons “out there”. Such a view amounts to saying 
that whenever we make rational judgments and form beliefs, it is never due to some 
reason that is independent of our current beliefs.38 Another way of putting this is to say 
that to be rational is just a matter of having the whole range of your existing beliefs and 
desires, new beliefs and desires, and motivations consistent. So then, the internalist is not 
denying a normative aspect to rationality; rather, he claims, an agent’s rationality can 
always be explained by his internal psychological states. 
 
What exactly does this response amount to? Suppose it is the case that  
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 Plus the relevant desire(s). 
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 Though it could be due to some non-rational cause.  
 33 
 
(r) If it is Thursday, then American Idol is on TV today. 
 (p) It is Thursday. 
  
Now Chartreuse, a rational agent, believes p and r. He then comes to believe that 
 
 (q) American Idol is on TV today. 
 
The internalist would say that it is not because p and q are true per se that Chartreuse 
believes q; rather, it is because he believed p and r, therefore he believes q. The reasons 
externalist might have no quarrel with this; the question is, what’s the force of the 
“because”? Let us first consider the candidates for explanation.  
 
We might suggest that what calls for explanation is the fact that Chartreuse believed q in 
the light of his beliefs that r and p, and not some other inconsistent or irrelevant 
proposition, or nothing at all. Could a causal account explain things? Not completely, I 
have claimed in the preceding section.39 (In particular, when we are concerned with 
actual cases of response to external reason, a causal analysis does not suffice. Obviously 
Chartreuse could simply have been caused to believe q, but as I argued, those cases do not 
count as rational responses.) Since I have already ruled out a causal analysis, I really do 
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not see how the internalist is to respond.40 It would not help the internalist’s case to 
appeal to yet another belief of Chartreuse’s, namely, the belief that  
 
(x) “If I believe that r and I believe that p, then I have a reason to believe in q.”  
 
This merely pushes the problem back one step, for more questions arise – why does 
Chartreuse believe that x? And why, in the light of believing that r, p and x, does he 
believe q? And we can see that an infinite regress is impending if the internalist was to 
posit yet another belief to explain this. 
 
There is, though, another way to cash out “because” - the force of the “because” is simply 
normative force. In this light, the externalist has a ready reply. He could say that 
Chartreuse believed q in the light of his beliefs in r and p because he had (external) reason 
to. It is not as if Chartreuse’s beliefs (or other psychological states) are irrelevant to 
explaining his coming to believe q – they are not sufficient conditions in themselves. The 
externalist simply admits that you need to specify something else – that Chartreuse 
responded rationally to external reasons. 
 
What if the internalist were to push the question a step further: “You say that Chartreuse 
believed q because he had reason to do so, namely, his beliefs in r and p. But why did he 
have to respond to that reason?”  
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Now the questioner could mean to say, “Why should he respond to that reason?” As Parfit 
notes in a somewhat different discussion, such questions have no force.41 It is as if the 
questioner was saying, “What reason did he have to do what he had reason to do?” We 
could not really ask such a question if we understood the normativity of external reasons. 
The answer, in this case, would simply be “He had a reason to do so!” Note that such 
reasons, if they do exist, are not brute facts - they are not true contingently. Parfit writes:  
 
“Justifications can end with some irreducibly normative truth. And such truths are 
not brute facts. The most important normative truths could not have been false. If we 
ask why these truths are true, we can sometimes give no further answer. But, since 
these truths are not brute facts, they can provide full, or complete justifications.”42  
 
Just think about whether modus ponens could have been false, for example.  
 
But might we have construed the question uncharitably? Perhaps the question was, “Why 
believe in normative truths?” We might then answer, “Because they are true.”43 And if 
the question was “Why did he respond to reason?,” the answer would be “Because he was 
rational.” It would not make any further sense to ask, “Why be rational?” - it would be the 
same question as the one in the previous paragraph.  
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A legitimate question could be, “What makes a rational being?” or “What is a rational 
being?” But that is a different kind of question altogether. It is different from the kind of 
explanation we were looking for. Hence, there is no regress of questions analogous to the 
case where we tried to reduce all explanations to psychological states.44  
 
Now, perhaps the internalist means to ask yet another sort of question, something like a 
challenge - namely, “What caused him to respond to that reason? Surely not the reason 
itself!” The worry here is how something abstract, like a normative truth, could become a 
motivating reason for us. After all, are we not part of the natural world? It is, in 
McDowell’s words, the notion that “the very idea of sensitivity to real demands of reason 
looks spooky, unless we can reconstruct it from materials that are naturalistic in the 
relevant sense.”45 But what exactly is the source of this judgment of ‘spookiness’, if not a 
prior commitment to some version of naturalism about the world which maintains that our 
mental states and psychological processes are reducible to natural, physical causes, 
thereby ruling out the idea of there being reasons that do not belong to the “realm of 
[natural] law?”46 If this is the objection, then I would happily deny that our mental states 
and processes are reducible to natural causes.  
 
“Give me an account.” The internalist/naturalist says. This sounds fair enough, in our 
overall quest to understand the world. But not as an objection here. I argue that we 
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respond to external reasons. It’s not enough to say that it sounds strange or spooky. 
Strangeness can be as awe-inspiring as it is perplexing. If anything, the onus is on the 
objector to point out what exactly is wrong with the argument, or give an argument that 
the conclusion is false.  
 
One possible reason for the adherence to reasons-internalism could be this. The internalist, 
I think, is confused about what it means to say that external reasons are independent of an 
agent’s psychological states. Of course, for external reasons to feature in purposive 
explanations of why an agent believed something, it may be the case that such 
explanations have to presuppose other beliefs and concepts already possessed by the 
agent. In this sense, these reasons don’t work independently, so to speak. But that is 
different from saying that every purposive explanation that appeals to objective facts is 
ultimately reducible to a statement about an agent’s psychological state. Beliefs and 
desires can be reason-giving. That is different from saying that all reasons are just beliefs 
and desires.  
 
My response to this overall objection in section 4 can be extended to desires and 
motivation as well. Suppose I have a desire to drink beer, and the belief that beer is in the 
fridge. I thereby acquire the motivation to walk to the fridge, and indeed, I do so.47 Now 
the familiar question would be, “Why did you walk to the fridge?” And the corresponding 
answer, “I want beer and it’s in the fridge.” Again, the internalist could restate this 
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explanation as, “I want beer and I believe that there’s beer in the fridge.” For such an 
explanation to make sense, the motivation and subsequent action have to have happened 
(at least in part) because of the relevant belief and desire. The belief and desire have to be 
relevant to the motivation and action. And if that is the case, then the next question is, 
“Why did you go to the fridge just because you wanted beer and believed it was in the 
fridge? Why not head for your wardrobe?” Such a question sounds superfluous, but only 
because acting rationally in this minimal way is taken for granted.  
 
Answer: “Isn’t it obvious? Isn’t my wanting beer and believing it to be in the fridge 
reason enough?” or “What are you talking about? You’re being unreasonable.” Such 
responses point us to something. As in Chartreuse’s case, it is not so much the belief and 
desire per se that explains the action, but being motivated rationally according to that 
belief and desire that does the explanatory work. And rationality, even in this minimal 
sense, involves obeying certain norms we normally take for granted. And these norms are 
surely external to the agent, in the sense that, even if the agent failed to follow them, they 
would not cease to exist as norms of rationality. And they are not just the relevant beliefs 
and desires, because an agent could fail to follow them (i.e. act irrationally) while having 
the beliefs and desires. As such, we see that any purposive explanation that tries to invoke 
psychological states invariably presupposes some notion of external reasons.  
 
The reason is simple. Even if explanations for actions always involve our internal 
psychological states, it does not mean that they only involve our psychological states. In 
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asking for reasons, we are not simply asking “What caused her to X?” but rather “Why 
did she X?”48 The preceding discussion shows that these questions are different questions. 
Indeed, there has to be an appropriate connection between the contents of the 
psychological states and the resulting motivations and actions of the agent. Internal 
reasons advocates like Williams call this deliberation; I think Hampton’s reply closes our 
response nicely:49  
 
...if deliberation is itself a normative notion, the forms of reasoning that count as 
instances of deliberation (correctly done) are also defined by norms. Such norms 
generate reasons – including reasons directing how we are to deliberate, what counts 
as correct deliberation, and when we ought to deliberate. Are these reasons regarding 
deliberation internal or external? If Williams answers “internal” how does that 
answer make sense, given that, in order to use it, he would have to invoke the 
concept of deliberation he is trying to define? 
 
 
- §2.3: External Reasons and Epiphenomenalism - 
 
So what if we do respond to external reasons? The significance is this. Given that we 
respond at all to these normative truths, we respond to them insofar as they influence the 
way our psychological states interact, specifically, in the way new beliefs and desires are 
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 In fact, to assume the former question would be to beg the question against external reasons. The latter 
question is more neutral. 
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 Hampton, The Authority of Reason, 76. 
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formed and existing beliefs and desires are given up. In responding to these rational 
norms, we form and discard beliefs so as to preserve a minimal level of coherence and 
consistency between the contents of different beliefs, as in the example of Chartreuse in 
§2.2.3. Also, as argued in §2.2.1, we form beliefs (and desires, if you accept that we 
respond to the content of external practical reasons) in response to facts in the world in a 
rational manner. And as illustrated by the ‘beer in the fridge’, beliefs and desires combine 
in such a way as to motivate an agent, or give rise to intentions to act, that are reasonable 
in the light of their contents. In other words, external, normative reasons affect internal, 
motivating reasons insofar as an agent is rational.50  
 
In the course of examining external reasons, it has also become apparent that any account 
of how agents respond to external reasons must invoke the contents of these internal 
states. Just as purposive explanations that invoke psychological states invariably 
presuppose some notion of external reasons, external reasons explanations necessarily 
involve the agent’s internal psychological states. Recall the Engineering Problem. If my 
arguments are sound, an explanation of Blue’s actions in determining the malfunctioning 
valve presupposes that he responds to external reasons. How this actually happens, and 
whether we can ever give an account of acting for external reasons that is more 
illuminating than simply saying that the agent was acting rationally, I do not intend to 
explore here.51 But whatever the case, I think it is at least clear that any such account of 
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 I leave it open what this “affects” consists of, whether an external reason becomes the motivating reason 
from the agent’s point of view, whether these external reasons are causes, and whether the agent, as an active 
cause, chooses a course of action by identifying with some external reason. These questions are no doubt 
important, but I cannot discuss them here.  
51
 See note above. 
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Blue’s response to external reasons necessarily involves the content of some internal 
psychological states, at the very least, some of his existing beliefs. For how else could he 
respond to those external reasons, except by being in some way influenced by them to 
form new psychological states, like beliefs? Recall that we have already established in 
§2.2.1 that the response of the agent to external reasons cannot be construed as a 
mechanical response to causes alone. And from the discussion in §2.2.3, we can see that 
insofar as external reasons feature in purposive explanations, these explanations include 
facts about the content of the agent’s psychological states (or internal reasons) themselves. 
Hence, if we admit that agents respond to external reasons, then we admit that the content 
of psychological states plays an explanatory role in action. 
 
That being that case, epiphenomenalism about the content of beliefs and desires is false. 
And of course, the eliminativist is prey to the same argument.  
 
 
- §2.4: The Indispensability of Intentionality - 
 
That external reasons are an indispensable part of many of our ordinary, everyday 
explanations does not in any way diminish the importance of internal reasons, or 
psychological states of an agent. Indeed, we have noted that insofar as an agent is 
responding to external reasons, these reasons can also be provided by facts about the 
content of an agent’s psychological states; facts that would nevertheless provide a reason 
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for the agent to X (where X-ing could mean forming a belief or desire, or performing an 
action) whether or not he was motivated to X. 
 
Now I don’t think anyone seriously denies that internal reasons feature in explanations, 
except perhaps for eliminativists about psychological states or semantic 
epiphenomenalists. Some philosophers might want to hold that all normative reasons are 
external, in the sense that, even if some of our beliefs and desires give us a reason to act, 
this is true only because of some external norms, such as  
 
(D) All else being equal, we have pro tanto reason to fulfill our desires, and to do so 
according to the way we believe would best achieve their fulfillment.  
 
These norms, such philosophers claim, are categorical and objective, being independent 
of whether these beliefs and desires are inherently motivating for a given agent.  
 
I have no quarrel with this view here. For even if (D) or something like it were true, it is 
still the case that to explain a certain action, we need to appeal to the agent’s beliefs and 
desires. Even if internal psychological states do not constitute complete explanations of 
an agent’s actions, they are a necessary part of such explanations.  
 
In the light of the above considerations, I am going to argue by way of responding to 
opposing views. My first objective in this section is to go after the eliminativist on 
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internal reasons. I take this position to be denying the reality of the content of 
psychological states, as normally construed in folk psychology. The latter view holds 
roughly that psychological states of a human agent include beliefs, desires, and other 
motivational states, and many of these states (like beliefs and desires) have content.52 
Though eliminativism might seem easy to dismiss for some, it is strangely resilient, never 
failing to count among its ranks some prominent advocate. I hope to show that the 
eliminativist line can assuredly be crossed out from our options. As it turns out, some of 




- §2.4.1 Against Eliminativism - 
 
The first argument is simple. Insofar as external reasons exist, they “work on” 
psychological states or they are made relevant to the agent via her psychological states. 
So in denying the reality of psychological states, or their normally identified semantic 
content, the eliminativist vis-à-vis psychological states is basically an eliminativist about 
reasons. For what else could count as reasons for us acting, believing - or anything for 
that matter - if neither facts about the world nor facts about our beliefs and desires are 
admitted into our framework?  
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 From this point on, I shall be referring to the eliminativist on internal reasons whenever I use the term 
“eliminativist.” 
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This last point, as pointed out by many others before, puts the eliminativist in an 
untenable position. If eliminativism is true, then there are no reasons.53 If there are no 
reasons whatsoever, then there are no reasons for anyone to be an eliminativist. So if 
eliminativism is true, we have no reasons to be eliminativists, or to take their claims 
seriously.54 And eliminativists have no reason to write papers on eliminativism, to argue 
their position, and so on. It should be clear, then, that eliminativism is a self-defeating 
view. Not in the sense that accepting it involves a contradiction, but in the sense that 
accepting it leaves you no justification for accepting it.55 An eliminativist about reason 
could not consistently or rationally argue for his view.  
 
The foregoing objection is in my view fatal. But at the risk of overkill, here is more. Since 
the eliminativist is nihilistic regarding psychological states, he must deny the reality of his 
own psychological states. But is it difficult to see how the eliminativist is able to 
coherently do so.  
 
“For how,” as Foster says, “can the nihilist deny that there are mental phenomena 
without representing this denial as an expression of his own view of the matter, and 
hence as an expression of something which pertains to his mental condition? How 
can he assert the nihilist position without thereby implying that it is something which 
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 I mean this in the sense that there are no reasons that are relevant to us. There might, of course, be reasons 
(internal or external) that non-humans, e.g. intelligent aliens, respond to. 
54
 This argument does not work against the naturalist who says that reasons are just causes, or can be reduced to 
causes. For the naturalist (unless he is also an eliminativist), does not deny the reality of reasons. However, if 
reasons cannot be reduced to causes, then (analytical) naturalism is not an option any more. In any case, my 
target in this section is not the naturalist about reasons. 
55
 Defeaters for a belief can be rebutting or undercutting defeaters. See Plantinga, Warrant and Proper 
Function, 41. These terms were introduced by John Pollock. Belief in eliminativism, it seems, provides an 
undercutting defeater for that very belief. 
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he himself believes to be true and hence mentally accepts?”56 
 
Indeed, this point is even stronger than the last objection. Not only are any grounds for 
eliminativism undercut, it is self-defeating in the sense that it poses a rebutting defeater 
against itself. Pointing to self-referential problems may seem a cheap tactic, but the point 
remains. And as Foster points out, even if the nihilist bites the bullet and denies that he 
has any beliefs and desires, the use of language presupposes some understanding. For 
whatever the sources of meaning, it should be clear that “language-meaning is only 
possible because language users have understanding. How, for example, could the term 
‘cat’ have the meaning it does unless English-speakers knew what a cat was (i.e. 
possessed a cat-concept) and used the term to signify that sort of thing (thus 
conceived)?”57 Reflecting on this seems to make it impossible for eliminativism to be 
true, since once beliefs are denied, the very meaning of ordinary language terms are cast 
in serious doubt.  
 
More related objections could be raised, but I think those above suffice.  
 
 
- §2.4.2 Against Semantic Epiphenomenalism – 
 
My next target is semantic epiphenomenalism (SE). Now SE escapes the last 2 charges. 
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 Foster, The Immaterial Self, 19. 
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 Ibid., 20.  
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But it is nevertheless susceptible to a version of the first undercutting defeater I raised 
against eliminativism. For beliefs and desires feature as reasons (for the reasons 
internalist) or are reason-giving (for the reasons externalist) qua their contents. And it is 
the efficacy of this content that is cast in question by the epiphenomenalist. The 
epiphenomenalist might not deny that beliefs and desires exist, and he might be pleased to 
affirm that we do believe for reasons. But insofar as the contents of these beliefs and 
desires have nothing whatsoever to do with our actions, we do not act for any reasons. 
This conclusion is surely non-trivial. If true, it means that semantic epiphenomenalists 
have no reason to argue their views, to write papers, and so on.58 Insofar as they behave 
as if they are doing these things, that are not moved by reason, or rationally acting.  
 
Moreover, SE implies that overt utterances cannot truly convey meanings about mental 
states. For again, whether or not meanings are all in the head, it is true that we cannot 
convey facts about the contents of our beliefs and desires if SE is true.59 As Foster says, 
“if mental items have no causal access to our speech centres, the notion of an 
introspective report collapses: even if the subject retains an introspective knowledge, his 
utterances do not count as expressing that knowledge if it contributes nothing to their 
production.”60 Foster’s line of reasoning is this: if [the contents of] mental states do not 
have effects on the physical, then they have no effects on behavior, and specifically, on 
how “linguistic practices involving ‘psychological’ terms are developed and sustained in 
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 In the subjective sense, as the following sentence implies. 
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 That is, whether or not content internalism is true. See for example, Putnam, “Meaning and Reference.”. 
Content externalism is a common objection to attempts to reduce intentionality to causes, but the objection I 
raise is independent of this.  
60
 Foster, The Immaterial Self, 191. I modify Foster’s argument slightly to focus on semantic 
epiphenomenalism instead of epiphenomenalism in general about the mental.  
 47 
the speech community.”61 This being the case, psychological terms as they appear in 
utterances should be analyzed purely in behavioral or functionalist terms. Such analyses, 
of course, would “deprive the epiphenomenalist the linguistic resources to enunciate his 
thesis.”62 If this argument stands, then SE becomes self-refuting when it is overtly 
expressed. Notwithstanding the number of  epiphenomenalists who would be content to 
hold their views in total silence, this restriction on overt expression makes 
epiphenomenalism implausible.  
 
Further problems loom. Suppose SE is true. It follows then that if you hold to a 
naturalistic worldview, the very reliability of our cognitive faculties is cast into doubt. 
Here’s why.63 The prevailing naturalistic account (and only plausible account) of human 
origins is the theory of evolution.64 On evolution, species and organisms are selected 
according to their certain traits that tend to enhance their fitness to the environment and 
their ability to survive long enough to properly reproduce. It is clear that adaptability to 
the environment and survival abilities are functions of a creature’s behavior alone, that is, 
how well you adapt and survive depends on what you do. To be sure, we want to say that 
what we in fact do is often a result of what we think. But on SE, the preceding claim 
cannot be true. On SE, the contents of our beliefs and desires (and whatever other mental 
states) are causally inefficacious. And since reasons explanations depend on content, 
reasons are simply irrelevant to a creature’s actions. It then follows that natural selection 






 I follow closely Plantinga’s argument in “Evolution, Epiphenomenalism, Reductionism.” 
64
 This does not, of course, imply that evolution itself is committed to naturalism. Rather, I am saying that 
evolution seems to be the only currently plausible account of human origins on a naturalistic worldview.  
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is indifferent to the content, and therefore the truth of beliefs. If a creature tends to avoid 
predators well, find prey effectively and reproduce successfully, its beliefs have nothing 
to do with it. Given SE, you cannot secure the truth, or at least the reliability of a 
creature’s beliefs by saying that true beliefs tend to produce behavior conducive to 
survival. Beliefs, whether true or false, have no effects on behavior. And hence, how well 
a creature survives and propagates has nothing to do with the reliability of its cognitive 
faculties towards producing true beliefs.  
 
As Plantinga points out,  
 
If false belief caused maladaptive action, natural selection could presumably modify 
belief-producing structures in the direction of greater reliability . . . But if content 
does not enter the causal chain that leads to behavior, then of course it will not be the 
case that a belief causes maladaptive behavior by virtue of its being false, and it will 
not be the case that a true belief causes the behavior it does by virtue of its being true. 
And then it is hard to see how natural selection can promote or enhance or reward 
true belief and penalize false belief.65  
 
On this note, how are we going to sound out the probability that our cognitive faculties 
are indeed reliable? Presumably, suggests Plantinga, we should think that a given belief B 
is as likely to be true as it is to be false. Hence, suppose that on naturalism and evolution, 
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 Plantinga, “Evolution, Epiphenomenalism, Reductionism”, 605. 
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the probability of a given belief B is 0.5. If that were the case,  
 
…it will be monumentally improbable that a person’s whole structure of beliefs 
displays the preponderance of true belief over false that reliability requires. If I have 
1000 beliefs, for example, the probability, on chance alone, that 3/4 or more of these 
beliefs are true ... will be less than 10-58.66 
 
This result is does not inspire confidence in the conjoined claims of naturalism and SE, to 
say the least. Note here that I am not saying that evolution cannot account for or explain 
why we have beliefs and desires. For even if they were casually inefficacious, they could 
share a common cause with some neuro-physical states that were selected for their 
survival-enhancing properties.67 But even if this were true, the truth of the beliefs, which 
is our concern, remains in question.  
 
At this point, someone might possibly jump in and say, “Aha, what you just said points to 
the possibility of a naturalistic account of content. If assignment of content is not 
independent of reliability of beliefs, then such an account might suffice to secure the 
reliability of beliefs.” So then, there are theories on which the content of a given belief, C, 
is tied to some neural event, N, such that it covaries with N.68 Since N is causally 
relevant to behavior, the instances where it occurs in an creature will be modified in such 
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 I have my doubts though, for other reasons. 
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 This objection and the account of content assignment can be found in Section 4 of Robinson, “Evolution and 
Epiphenomenalism.” Williams account, further simplified here, follows Fodor’s theory of psychosemantics.  
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a way as to be conducive for survival. Suppose N occurs mostly when F is present in the 
environment, and C is the belief that an F is present. Suppose further that sometimes, N 
does not occur when F is present. This might lead to some maladaptive behavior which 
might subsequently be corrected, via some reassignment of synaptic strengths along 
neural pathways such that N does occur in future, given enough instances of adjustment. 
Ex hypothesi, C becomes true more often. On this account, beliefs such as C can be 
selected for, via their neurophysical counterparts with which they co-vary.  
 
Granted this story, the problem only gets pushed back one step. The question then 
becomes: what is the probability that for every belief C, there is some N, such that (i) C 
covaries reliably with N, and (ii) C’s content is a true (or consistent) representation of the 
conditions under which N occurs? Indeed, given that C’s content has no effect whatsoever 
on physical states, this account of psychosemantics does not secure the reliability of 
beliefs any better than plain old natural selection, simply because the (i) and (ii) are as 
improbable.  
 
Hence, I maintain that given the conjunction of naturalism and SE, the probability that 
our cognitive faculties are reliable is either low or inscrutable. This, I believe, is not a 
result naturalists should be comfortable with. As such, naturalists have reason to reject 
SE.  
 
We have considered a few objections against SE which I think are more than adequate. 
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However, I think that independent of these considerations, it should be plain to us, from 
our perspective as active agents in the world, that epiphenomenalism is false. We simply 
know from our perspective that we do act for reasons. Whether these reasons are 
ultimately reducible to causes is another matter that should not detract us from the truth of 
the former statement. As Burge remarks,  
 
Most of our intellectual and practical norms and evaluations presuppose that we are 
agents. If our willing or deciding made something happen, but that event’s being a 
willing or deciding were not causally efficacious (so that the efficacy resided in some 
underlying neural property), then the agency would not be ours. If our theoretical 
deliberations were not ours to control, we could not see ourselves as being the 
authors of our theories; nor could we criticize ourselves as deliberators. Most 
normative evaluations of our intellectual and practical activities would be empty.69  
 
To wit, the problem with epiphenomenalism becomes obvious with a little self-reflection 
on our role as agents. But am I begging the question here, by simply claiming that we act 
for reasons, when this is the very thesis of the paper? Not so, I hope. More precisely, my 
claim is that upon reflection, you believe that you act for reasons, and that belief is 
especially strong when you take a step back from philosophical musings and start 
performing ordinary, purposeful actions as an agent in the real world.  
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 Burge, “Mind-Body Causation and Explanation,” 119. 
 52 
In fact, that epiphenomenalism should be avoided is suggested by the whole industry of 
projects trying to secure the causal efficacy of mental properties or mental states qua their 
mental content.70 We need only take a leaf from the barrage of criticism directed at 
Davidson’s anomalous monism. Whatever the merits or shortcomings of his theory, 
Davidson and his critics agree on one thing: epiphenomenalism to be avoided at all 
costs.71 Also, Crane does well to remind us that “the original motivation for physicalism 
was the need to explain the place of mental causation in the physical world.”72 This 
implies that mental causation should be something we take as obvious.  
 
With that in mind, whatever perceived reason we might have tempting us towards 
epiphenomenalism, Burge’s comments are instructive here: 
 
It is much surer that epiphenomenalism is false than that the various assumptions 
(even including the materialist assumptions) that have been thought to lead to it are 
true. It is also much surer that epiphenomenalism is false than that the various 
attempts to show it false or avoidable by appeal to counterfactuals, accounts of laws, 
or supervenience, are true. Epiphenomenalism is often taken as a serious 
metaphysical option. But it is better seen as at best a source of pressure for clarifying 
our common conceptions.73 
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Fodor is more dramatic: 
 
I’m not really convinced that it matters very much whether the mental is physical; 
still less that it matters very much whether we can prove that it is. Whereas, if it isn’t 
literally true that my wanting is causally responsible for my reaching, and my itching 
is causally responsible for my scratching, and my believing is causally responsible 
for my saying...if none of that is literally true, then practically everything I believe 
about anything is false and it’s the end of the world.74 
 
A bit hyperbolic perhaps, but the lesson we can take is this: our mental states have to be 
relevant to our explanations of actions – that much is true.75  
 
 
- §2.5: The Priority of Reasons Explanations - 
 
Building on the above reflections, we might ask how there is much of philosophy of mind 
in the first place. Prior to how intentionality is analyzed and whether mental states are 
physical states, is the question of how we come to identify psychological mental states 
and distinguish them.76 Again, I find that Burge’s remarks put things into perspective: if 
we think about it, it seems to be true that “the system of intentional content attribution is 
                                                        
74
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the fundamental means of identifying intentional mental states and events in 
psychological explanation and in our self-attributions. In fact, we have no other 
systematic way of identifying such states and events.”77 Indeed, intentional content “is 
the explanatory and identificatory centre of [psychological] events. We have little else to 
go on in talking about the causal powers and ontology of the mental.”78 
 
And Baker sounds the same note by arguing that philosophers should start from good 
explanations, and not some prior metaphysical commitment: 
 
My suggestion is to take as our philosophical starting-point, not a metaphysical 
doctrine about the nature of causation or of reality, but a range of explanations that 




Instead of beginning with a full-blown metaphysical picture, we should begin with a 
range of good explanations, scientific and commonsensical. In the spirit of G. E. 
Moore, I think that our grounds for the claims that reasons sometimes explain 
behavior are much stronger than any grounds from a metaphysical premise that 
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would lead to a contrary conclusion.80 
 
This in no way denies the significance of metaphysics, and it is irrelevant to the status and 
priority of metaphysics in philosophy. The gist of Burge’s and Baker’s remarks, as I take 
them, is more a caution against the temptation to do philosophy with an unyielding 
adherence to a comprehensive metaphysical picture at-whatever-price of our 
commonsense intuitions. This is not to say that intuitions cannot be revised, but rather 
that in a process of reflective equilibrium, we should always be careful about dogged 
persistence on some metaphysical commitment – there is a point where intuitions suffice 
to tip the balance against theory, where we should simply revise or reject the metaphysical 
picture instead of fighting individual fires over each problem that arises. And I hope that 
my arguments have shown that reasons are indispensable in that respect, in virtue of the 
role they play in explanations.  
 
In fact, if you take the philosophical enterprise to be in part about discovering truth, then 
insofar as we are doing philosophy, we are always giving reasons in favor of or against 
the truth of some view. As pointed out earlier, it just seems impossible for an eliminativist 
or epiphenomenalist to consistently do philosophy. (Things stand differently for the 
reductionist, since he is not denying the very notions of reasons, intentionality, etc., but 
rather claiming that they can be reduced to some other states.) 
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Taking stock, I have argued for the indispensability of both external reasons and internal 
reasons to explanation of action. These are arguments against epiphenomenalism and 
eliminativism. External reasons, while they are independent of an agent’s psychological 
states, do in fact feature in explanations of an agent’s actions, and if they do so, we cannot 
dismiss the role of content in these psychological states. At the same time, independent of 
whether agents respond to external reasons, the content of psychological states are a 
necessary part of explanations of action by virtue of being internal reasons. In the light of 
these considerations, the content, or intentionality of psychological states should never be 
taken to be non-existent or inefficacious. Come what may, reasons are here to stay.  
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- § 3 The Irreducibility of Intentionality - 
 
Having established that intentional states, particularly their contents, are indispensable 
together with reasons-explanations, I will move on to answering the Conceptual Question. 
In this chapter then, I will be arguing that intentional states cannot be reduced to physical 
causes.  
 
As pointed out in Chapter 1, the claim that intentional states cannot be reduced to 
physical causes is to be distinguished from the claim that intentional states are not causes 
per se, in the sense that they do not contribute to events in any way. The latter claim 
means that no event ever happens because of some intentional state - that explanations of 
events (including actions of agents) need never appeal to intentional states. The former 
claim, however, entails only that if intentionality does feature in explanations, then some 
aspects of explanations are non-physical. If complete explanations of certain events 
(particularly regarding agents) necessarily invoke intentionality, then explanations from 
physical causes alone are insufficient for such events. As stated in Chapter 1, an argument 
of the following form can be given for this: 
 
S1. If an event happens because (at least in part) of some intentional state, then an 
explanation of that event should include that state.  
 
S2. Intentional states cannot be reduced to physical causes. 
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S3. Thus, if an explanation involves intentional states, some aspect of that 
explanation is non-physical.81  
 
S4. Hence, if an event happens because (at least in part) of some intentional state, 
then some aspect of an explanation of that event must be non-physical.  
 
S5. Some events happen (at least in part) due to intentional states. 
 
S6. Hence, some aspects of explanations of events are non-physical. 
 
In this section my concern is with S2, which is a conceptual claim. If S2 is true, then 
physicalist accounts of the world are false, since there are some events which can only be 
explained by (irreducibly) non-physical facts. 
 
I will give five arguments for S2, the claim that intentional states cannot be reduced to 
physical causes. The first three, I believe, are the strongest, and they focus on the use of 
practical reason, i.e. reasons we have to act in a certain way, or to be motivated to act in a 
certain way. Prior to expounding on the arguments, however, I shall establish a principle 
pertaining to instrumental rationality.  
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 There is a related debate on whether intentional states cause other events qua their content, or whether the 
intentionality of the intentional state is relevant to an explanation of an event. I take it to be true that when an 
explanation necessarily appeals an intentional state, it does so such that the intentionality of the intentional state 
is relevant to the explanation.  
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- §3.1 The Principle of Instrumental Rationality - 
 
The kind of practical reasoning that I am interested in is means-end reasoning (also called 
instrumental reasoning). As the term implies, this is reasoning about the means to an end. 
Whether this is the only kind of practical reasoning that goes on with rational agents, I 
will not discuss here. The point to note is that this sort of reasoning does not concern 
itself with the ultimate ends or goals an agent should have; the concern is rather how to 
achieve certain given goals. Different theories have different ideas on what ultimate goals 
are really based on. Some philosophers, like Derek Parfit, believe that what we ultimately 
have reason to do is based on irreducible normative truths that are independent of an 
agent’s particular dispositions or desires. Others, like Bernard Williams, hold that the 
reasons that an agent has to act derive from or simply reduce to facts about that particular 
agent’s desires, or more generally, what Williams calls his “subjective motivational set,” 
82
 which contains not only his desires (taken in the narrow sense) but also “dispositions 
of evaluation, patterns of emotional reaction, personal loyalties, and various projects, as 
they may be abstractly called, embodying commitments of the agent.”83 As mentioned, I 
will not choose between these theories for our present purposes.  
 
Instead, the point is that whatever theory of reasons you pledge allegiance to, you should 
agree with the following statement:   
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R: If S is rational, then given that S desires to Y and believes that X-ing would best 
achieve Y, S is motivated to X. 
 
A few qualifications are in place here. Here, I take the motivation to X to be pro tanto, 
and hence this motivation could be overridden by other stronger desires in conjunction 
with other beliefs. In such cases, the motivation could well disappear. But taking the 
desire to Y and the belief that X-ing would achieve Y by themselves, ceteris paribus, the 
agent has to be motivated, insofar as he or she is rational. So if you like, we could add an 
additional clause, making the principle in effect,  
 
R: If S is rational, then given that S desires to Y and believes that X-ing would best 
achieve Y, S is motivated to X, absent other desires and beliefs.  
 
For purposes of brevity, I shall leave out this last clause for the rest of the discussion. As 
for being rational, this involves appropriately responding to the reasons we have, and in 
this case, the reasons are provided (at least in part) by the intentional states, i.e. the 
relevant belief and desire. With these stipulations, it seems to me that R is a kind of 
minimal condition for instrumental rationality.  
 
Consider a simple example. Suppose Jason’s only desire is to marry Jane. He believes that 
he can best achieve this aim by proposing to Jane. However, he is not motivated at all to 
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propose to Jane. It’s not as if he believes something else, such as that he would not 
succeed if he were to try. He is confident that he would succeed if he were to propose. It 
does seem that an agent like Jason is simply irrational. While this is just a single example, 
it also seems that there is nothing special about the features of this case that elicits our 
judgment about the agent’s irrationality. It appears clear that in all cases where an agent 
desires Y and is aware that Y can be achieved by X-ing, he would be irrational not to be 
motivated to X. It follows that if S is rational, then S must be motivated to X.  
 
But given the above considerations for R, it seems that R is not just some contingent fact 
about rational agents in our particular world. R seems to capture the meaning of practical 
rationality itself, independent of whom these agents are or what world they come from. If 
R is true, then the relation between reasons and motivation for rational agents hold in all 
possible worlds.  
 
Hence we can say that  
 
R1: Necessarily, if S is rational, then given that S desires Y and believes that X-ing 
will achieve Y, S is motivated to X. 
 
This principle tells us something about intentional states and how they tie in with an 
agent’s motivation. I shall call this the Principle of Instrumental Rationality, or just R1 for 





- 3.2 Three Arguments from Practical Reasoning - 
 
Drawing on the Principle of Instrumental Rationality, I will give three modal arguments 
against physicalism. The first argument focuses on the case of rational agents, the second 
on a possible world where there are no causal facts, and the third appeals to the possible 
irrationality of agents.  
 
 
- §3.2.1 The Argument from Rational Necessity - 
 
Here’s my first argument, the Argument from Rational Necessity. Suppose an agent (call 
him Magnolia) does desire to Y and believes that X-ing would achieve Y. Magnolia has 
an overwhelming desire to drink beer, and he believes that the way to get beer is to walk 
to the kitchen. Like a rational agent, Magnolia then acquires the motivation to walk to the 
kitchen. Let us denote the event “Magnolia is motivated to walk to the kitchen” as γ. Let 
us call his respective belief and desire, i.e. the intentional states relevant to his coming to 
be motivated, P.  
 
Now if reasons are just natural causes, there must be a causal account of Magnolia 
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coming to be motivated as well. On a simple physicalist account, any intentional state is 
identical to or can be reduced to some physical event, for example, the firing of some 
neurons. A more sophisticated physicalist account of Magnolia coming to be motivated 
could be a functionalist account, which includes the possible kinds of preceding events 
(say, neural correlates of intentional states, or the intentional states themselves) and their 
causal relations that lead up to γ.84 On this functionalist account, providing a description 
of the causal relations between the events that relevantly or uniquely lead up to γ would 
constitute a natural account of Magnolia’s being motivated. Let us call this set of causal 
relations between events in the functionalist account, C. Other physicalist accounts 
include taking intentional states to be either type- or token-identical to some physical 
states.85 On such accounts, we can take C to represent those physical states and their 
causal relations.  
 
Now if reasons can be reduced to physical causes, then C and P must be identical. Now 
recall the Principle of Instrumental Rationality, R1. This implies that 
  
(A1) Necessarily, if Magnolia is rational, then (if P, then γ). 
I.e.: Necessarily, if Magnolia is rational, then (if he has an overwhelming desire to 
drink beer and he believes that the way to get beer is to walk to the kitchen, then he 
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 A functional account might also include the kinds of events following γ, but if reasons are just causes, then 
the existence of the reason(s) to X temporally prior to γ, up to the point where γ occurs, are sufficient as an 
explanation for γ. Ex hypothesi, the causal story prior to γ occurring up to the point where γ occurs should 
suffice as an explanation for γ as well. Of course, the functionalist’s analysis of mental properties (or state) 
often includes both antecedent and consequent events of that property (or state) and their causal relations. 
85
 See for example, Lewis “An Argument for the Identity Theory”, “Psycholophysical and Theoretical 
Identifications,” Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind, “The Nature of mind,” among others.  
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is motivated to walk to the kitchen.)  
 
This is essentially substituting the relevant stuff from our example into R1. And the 
necessity seems to hold, no matter which world we are in. The truth of the statement 
would not change if Magnolia was a rational alien instead of a rational human being. So 
far, so good. 
 
But try to substitute into R1 the set C, i.e. the natural causes from the analysis of the 
intentional states, and you get this:  
 
(A2) Necessarily, if Magnolia is rational, then (if C, then γ). 
I.e.: Necessarily, if Magnolia is rational, then (if such-and-such physical state A and 
such-and-such physical state B and etc… are causally related in such-and-such a way, 
then he is motivated to walk to the kitchen). 
 
This seems false. For we just need to conceive of a possible world W’ where different 
causal relations hold between events or states-of-affairs.86 This point should be clear, 
despite the current limitations in our understanding of causation. Whether we think of 
physical causes as mere regularities, falling under a natural law, or hold to some 
counterfactual theory of causation, it is clear that “A causes B” does not mean “A 
logically necessitates B.” Under such conditions, the set of events and causal relations in 
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 Or where the laws of nature were different. 
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C would not by themselves necessarily lead to us to γ.87 In W’, C might not causally lead 
to γ, but to some other event. You might take this also as an argument showing that if 
intentional states are realized at all by physical causes, they must at least be 
multiply-realized. This means that there is no single set of physical causes that can be said 
to be identical to intentional states of belief and desire. Given that A1 is true and that A2 
is false, C and P cannot be identical.88  
 
Perhaps I should make a side-remark here that this first argument is not terribly original. 
In fact, Norman Malcolm gave a somewhat similar argument in his paper, “The 
Conceivability of Mechanism” many years ago. I don’t think that that argument works, 
however, mainly because of a fatal ambiguity in his appeal to “countervailing factors.” 
Hence, my own argument differs from his insofar as I avoid talk of these “countervailing 
factors” and add the clause that the agent must be rational for the logical necessity to hold 
in the case of intentional states. 
 
Is this argument sound? The most direct objection, I think, goes something like this: we 
could try to make A2 true, by understanding rationality as a kind of rule for causal 
analyses of intentional states. For a start, consider  
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 Of course, the type-identity theorists (and perhaps certain other proponents of physicalism) will object here. 
In particular, they might claim that whatever intentional events (such as desiring a beer) that figure as reasons 
(in a desire-based account of reasons) are tied to the neurological events that belong as causes to the set C, such 
that it would be impossible for C not to lead to γ when P leads to γ. But part of my aim here is to show precisely 
that such accounts are false, by showing that reasons for action cannot be accounted for in these physicalist 
accounts. In other words, by independently considering the causes and reasons for γ insofar as they feature as 
explanations of γ, I claim that A1 and A2 are true.  
88
 Norman Malcolm has an argument similar to this in The Conceivability of Mechanism. 
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R2: For any rational agent, it is the case that if C, then γ.  
 
That is to say, given that such-and-such physical state A and such-and-such physical state 
B, etc. are causally related in such-and-such a way, then the appropriate motivational state 
follows, insofar as the agent is rational. This becomes a sort of causal constraint on the 
kinds of causal relations between events that are allowed with regards to a rational agent. 
In other words, if an agent is rational, then certain physical events (to do with the agent) 
must follow, given certain other antecedent physical events - it is not the case that any 
causal relation would suffice once we have specified the antecedents. In this case, if the 
events and causal relations described in C were present in a rational agent, then the 
appropriate motivation γ must follow. This seems plausible. Given that there are such 
things as natural laws, the physical states that underlie the desire and belief89 of a 
rational agent would be identified as those that lead causally to his being motivated. Thus, 
it is true that those physical states underlying Magnolia’s belief and desire lead to his 
motivation, if he is rational. Fair enough. But is R2 inconsistent with the falsity of A2? 
Not necessarily, it seems. 
 
This depends on whether R2 is true only in the actual world or true in all possible worlds. 
Clearly, in some other world W’, it might be the case that some other principle dictating 
causes and their effects fulfilled the condition for instrumental rationality. Since natural 
laws are logically contingent, if C is stipulated in a way such that R2 is true, it might not 
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 Assuming there are such equivalents. If reasons are to be reduced to causes, this assumption is necessary. 
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be the correct functional specification for those intentional states in worlds where 
completely different natural laws hold, simply because those same states, causally related 
in the same way, might bring about different effects in accordance to those laws. In a 
world like W’, the following might be true:  
 
R2’: For any rational agent, it is the case that if C, then γ’. 
 
where γ’ is another mental state instead of the Magnolia’s being motivation to walk to the 
fridge. 
 
So then, R2 will not do; what we need is something like:  
 
R3: Necessarily, for any rational agent it is the case that if C, then γ.  
 
But then, such a formulation does little better. First of all, what reason to we have to 
postulate R3, other than to support a theory that intentional states are just physical causes? 
It doesn’t seem like there is any independent consideration in favor of a proposition like 
R3. More importantly, it seems false in the light of what we have said earlier regarding 
the contingency of natural laws across possible worlds. Of course, one might reply that 
the additional factor here is rationality. But what, if anything, has rationality got to do 
with laws governing causal relations between events? It seems implausible that a norm of 
rationality should restrict the way in which certain physical events are causally related. If 
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anything, this just shows that the kind of necessity present in rational norms is radically 
different from the nomological or natural necessity found in the laws of nature. And this 
is the reason why the intentionality of mental states cannot be reduced to mere causes. 
The propositional content of these states are subject to rational norms which do not vary 
across worlds the way natural laws that govern physical causes vary. Hence, the 
intentionality of the mental states of belief and desire is irreducible.  
 
It might be pointed out that all I have shown is that no given intentional state is reducible 
to a particular set of physical causes. This is compatible with the claim that all intentional 
states are reducible to some set of physical causes. But what would such a “reduction” 
amount to? Even if this last claim were true, it is still the case that no physical state is 
identical to an intentional state. For suppose the intentional state X is realized by the set 
of physical causes C1 in world W1, and a different set of physical causes C2 in world W2. 
Since C1 and C2 are different, X is not identical to either. But all this means is that some 
physical states have the property of realizing an intentional state (and the meaning of 
“realizing” I shall intentionally leave ambiguous). What if having an intentional state just 
is having some 2nd order property of physical states – namely, the property of having 
some property (or properties) that fulfill the rationality condition? Defined thus, different 
sets of physical causes realize the same intentional state, and as the functionalist will 
claim, there is nothing metaphysically left over once we have counted our causes.  
 
My rejoinder here is to ask the question: how do we stipulate the rationality condition 
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without recourse to some non-physical aspect or slipping into circularity? In other words, 
if we identify intentional states not with physical states, but rather with the second-order 
property of having some property (or properties) that fulfill the rationality condition, then 
it seems that we are left with something irreducible, i.e. the rationality condition itself. 
And the rationality condition to be observed is R1, the Principle of Instrumental 
Rationality itself. And it would not do to simply say that to fulfill R1 just is for the 
physical states to be causally related “in such-and-such a way”. For the sort of ways in 
which the states are to be causally related is precisely in question here.  
 
Is there still room for the functionalist to maneuver? Well, it might be denied that this 
rationality condition presents a problem in the first place. After all, it could be said that 
even if a conceptual (analytical) reduction of intentional states to causes is impossible, a 
metaphysical reduction has been achieved. That is to say, all the facts there are, are just 
physical facts. I must say that I am not exactly clear on whether such a distinction can be 
drawn between analytic and metaphysical forms of reduction. In particular, if the 
conceptual reduction of intentional states to causes is incomplete, then it is not even clear 
that intentional states are second-order properties of physical states at all. Furthermore, if 
beliefs and desires are the sort of states that have properties that are tied to rationality 
conditions, then it is not clear that they are identical with any physical states. What then, 
are these intentional states? Abstract concepts? If my argument in the preceding chapter 
goes through, then this is not a live option. As such, the victory claimed for so-called 
metaphysical reduction is little more than Pyrrhic. Moreover, I will argue again in §3.2.3 
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(in my final argument from practical reason) that there is a problem with the sort of 
metaphysical reduction to be done when rationality is concerned. This being the case, we 
can move on to the next argument. 
 
 
- §3.2.2 The Argument from Absent Causes - 
 
Suppose an agent in the actual world, S, has a desire to Y, has the belief that X-ing would 
bring about Y, and is motivated to X. Let the belief and desire set be P. Suppose some sort 
of physicalism is true. If so, the mental states which we identify as reasons for an agent’s 
X-ing, i.e., the relevant beliefs and desires, are merely physical states. If functionalism is 
true, the mental states are identified as the physical states by virtue of the fact that they 
play the same functional roles. Now, suppose the agent comes to acquire a motivation to 
X, namely γ. Ask the question, what caused γ? Plausibly, the firing of certain neurons in 
the agent’s brain. Or perhaps a more complex set of physical states causally related in 
some way. Let C then be the set of physical states/causal relations leading up to γ which 
are identified by the physicalist/functionalist reduction of P.  
 
Now consider the possible world W*. In W*, the same things happen as in the actual 
world, but contrary to appearances, nothing is caused whatsoever. In other words, what 
we have in W* is a monumentally improbable set of patterns and regularities exhibited by 
sequences of events which are not causally related at all. No event is a cause or effect or 
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another event. Monumentally improbable, but logically possible nonetheless. Could there 
be a rational agent with beliefs and desires in that world? Well, at the very least, it seems 
that the Principle of Instrumental Rationality, R1, can still be satisfied. Recall 
 
R1: Necessarily, if S is rational, then (given that S desires Y and believes that X-ing 
will achieve Y, S is motivated to X). 
 
Since the “if… then...” clause does not exclusively prescribe a causal relationship 
between the antecedent and consequent, as long as the relevant mental events in World 
W* match up each time - e.g. the event of P occurring is always followed by the event of 
γ occurring - having rational agents with intentional states is not out of the question in W*. 
Of course, the consequent in R1 is merely a necessary condition for there to be rational 
agents, not a sufficient one. But it does seem we can coherently imagine rational agents in 
such a world – after all, the same mental events happen in W* as in the actual world. On 
the other hand, C cannot exist is such a world – since in the actual world, C is defined as a 
set of causal relations, and there are no causal relations in W*. Strange world W* is, 
perhaps, but it is not clear what could be said against the possibility of such a world. 
 
The first to be up in arms over this argument would, I expect, be those who claim that 
causal facts are logically supervenient on physical facts. I have no space here to address 
this claim, and thus I will grant that this argument would not convince the above group.  
Another objection would be to insist that beliefs and desires are necessarily casually 
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efficacious. But there seems to be no good reason for holding this view. Moreover, if we 
could tell a priori that beliefs and desires are necessarily causally efficacious, then 




- §3.2.3 The Argument from Irrationality – 
 
In this last argument I wish to demonstrate more clearly what exactly is wrong with trying 
to reduce intentional states to some configuration of physical causes. In particular, I wish 
to show that the kind of normative requirements of rationality that rational agents adhere 
to serve to constrain intentional states in a way that cannot be translated properly into 
physical causes. This argument also targets the functionalist who claims that intentional 
states are 2nd order properties of physical states – namely, the properties of having some 
property (or properties) that fulfill the rationality condition. There are actually two parts 
to this argument. I shall first present a case that I think is not a knockdown argument, but 
which gives a certain useful result that will come in handy further on. 
 
Suppose we begin with conditions similar to those framing the Argument from Rational 
Necessity (§3.2.1). Only that in this case, there is no specification that the agent is rational. 
It could then be claimed that  
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(B1) Absent rational considerations, there is no natural (or nomological) necessity 
that (if P, then γ).90 
 
(B2) Absent rational considerations, it is nevertheless a matter of natural (or 
nomological) necessity that (if C, then γ).  
 
If (B1) and (B2) hold, then the intentional states (P) cannot be reduced to some causal 
relations. Now consider 
 
R3: Necessarily, for any rational agent it is the case that if C , then γ. 
 
R3 makes no difference to Case 2 at all, since Case 2 is concerned with irrationality. Once 
the agent is irrational, both R1, the Principle of Instrumental Rationality, and R3 are 
irrelevant. Nevertheless, it might be argued, B2 remains true, because the laws of nature 
are not sensitive to conditions of rationality at all. If there is a set of causes C that cause γ 
according to natural laws, then C lead to γ, no matter whether the agent is rational or not. 
But perhaps here the functionalist will protest against B2 by asserting that as long as C 
leads to γ, the agent cannot be identified as irrational.  
 
This response is less than satisfactory. For the question here is not whether S is acting 
                                                        
90
 I shall use the term natural necessity to denote the kind of necessity that holds in virtue of laws of nature. I 
shall be neutral here as to whether laws of nature are relations between universals or constitutive of objects that 
they govern. In any case, I trust that a general understanding of natural necessity and possibility is possible 
without going into the specifics of theories about laws of nature. Also, henceforth whenever I refer to necessity 
simpliciter I will be using it in the sense of logical necessity. 
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rationally or not. Rather, the question is whether S’ rationality has anything to do with 
whether C leads to γ. Now if it does not, then B2 is true. For all we care, S could be 
acting rationally when C leads to γ. But putting considerations of rationality aside, the 
point is that in the actual world, it is necessarily true (by the laws of nature) that C leads 
to γ, while it is not necessarily true that P leads to γ.  
 
So the previous response fails. But the functionalist can, I think, object successfully to B2. 
She could claim that B2 is false, in the sense that strictly speaking, C naturally 
necessitates γ only if certain other physical states are present. As such, C alone does not 
naturally necessitate γ.  
 
Obviously, if “alone” implied that C was the only set of causes in the entire universe at 
time t, then C wouldn’t naturally necessitate γ at time t. But this isn’t what we are really 
concerned about for B1 and B2. We are not just saying that if P were the only set of 
intentional states, then P would not naturally necessitate γ.91 
 
Can the argument be modified such that the other physical states are “held constant” so 
that C naturally necessitates γ? 
 
We can happily grant that C naturally necessitates γ together with a set of other relevant 
physical states. We can put it more precisely this way. At t, C causes γ in S. If this is true, 
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 Though this is true.  
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there should be a set B at t such that together with B, C naturally necessitates γ. What 
exactly B consists of, we do not have to speculate. For all we know, every physical state 
in the past light cone of γ (which occurs at t) might be causally relevant. Whatever the 
case, let B be the causally relevant background conditions. Also, let the set of whatever 
laws of nature there are be L. Finally, let the conjunction of B and L be BL.  
 
Given all of this, we can recast the argument. Take a rational case (similar to the case in 
§3.2.1): 
 
A1: Necessarily, if S is rational, then (if P, then γ). 
 
No doubt the functionalist will claim that P is some set of causal relations; call it C. 
According to whatever laws of nature (L) and background conditions (B) there are, C will 
naturally necessitate γ. Now hold BL constant and claim that 
 
(B1’) Absent rational considerations, there is no natural (or nomological) necessity that 
(if P and BL, then γ). 
 
(B2’) Absent rational considerations, it is nevertheless a matter of natural (or 
nomological) necessity that (if C and BL, then γ). 
 
The only way (and it seems, the right way) for the functionalist to respond is to deny B2’, 
 76 
not by denying that C and BL together naturally necessitate γ (indeed, this is true by 
stipulation), but by simply denying that we can absent the rationality clause and still hold 
BL constant. And since rationality is not a law of nature, it is B - the background 
conditions - that will have to give way.  
 
I think this response from the functionalist is effective. However, it comes at a certain 
cost to the functionalist camp. Despite being able to deflect the above argument, the 
functionalist is now committed to rationality being somehow present in the background 
conditions, which is to say that rationality is somehow contained in physical states.  
 
To begin with, this is inconsistent with the response I claimed the functionalist would 
give in response to the Argument from Rational Necessity, where rationality was taken as 
a principle or law governing the sort of causal relations that can take place in a rational 
agent. Although I dealt with that sort of response in §3.2.1, it seems that now we have a 
quicker way to settle the issue: the functionalist has to choose between the two ways to 
construe rationality. If he takes rationality to be composed of physical states, then he 
deprives himself of a response to the Argument from Rational Necessity; if he chooses to 
define rationality as a principle or law, then it appears that he cannot deflect the above 
argument given in (B1’) and (B2’).  
 
I will now end with the last argument proper to show that, in fact, rationality cannot be 
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taken as some set of physical states.92 And here I will target the functionalist who allows 
for multiple-realization of intentional states by taking intentional states to be second-order 
properties. This will complete the Argument from Irrationality.  
 
Take the following possible worlds: 
 
World W1: 
In W1, the desire to Y and the belief that X-ing will achieve Y (call this set of 
intentional states P1) is realized by a set of physical states which are causally related 
in some way. Let this set be C. Given that the agent is rational, by the laws of nature 
in W1, the event of an agent being in C will cause the agent to be motivated to X 
(call this γ1). 
 
World W2: 
In W2, the desire to Y and the belief that not X-ing will achieve Y (call this set of 
intentional states P2) is also realized by the set of causal relations denoted by C. 
Given that the agent is rational, by the laws of nature in W2, the event of an agent 
being in C will cause the agent to be motivated to not-X (call this γ2). 
 
It should not be contested that these are indeed possible worlds. Given different laws of 
nature, it is possible for different beliefs to be realized by the same set of physical states. 
                                                        
92
 Or any single physical state. 
 78 
Now consider the world W3: 
 
 World W3: 
In W3, the desire to Y and the belief that not X-ing will achieve Y (the set P2) is, 
similar to W2, realized by the set of causal relations denoted by C. Given that the 
agent is rational, by the laws of nature in W3, however, the event of an agent being in 
C will, similar to the case in W1, cause the agent to be motivated to X (γ1). 
 





















W1 P1 C L1 γ1 



















Table 1: Possible Worlds and States  
 
It will not take the attentive reader long to notice that there is something wrong about W3. 
For in W3, the intentional states, as realized by physical causes, actually lead to 
motivation that is irrational rather than rational. To spell it out, the agent desires to Y and 
believes that not X-ing would lead to Y. However, according to the laws of nature, these 
states lead to the agent being motivated to X. This is a paradigm of irrationality. So then, 
what is wrong with W3? 
 
There are only three ways in which the description of W3 can be faulted. First, we could 
find fault with the specification of the intentional states P2 as C. But there seems nothing 
wrong with this per se, since this specification is similar to the one in W2, and that world 
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seemed eminently possible. Second, we could quarrel with the claim that if the agent was 
rational, C together with the laws of nature would lead to γ1 (i.e. the agent being 
motivated to X). But again, there seems nothing wrong. After all, this same claim was 
made in W1, and that world seemed eminently possible as well. The blame then must lie 
with the combination of the two claims above.  
 
In other words, the problem is this. In a world such that given that an agent is rational, C 
would lead to the agent being motivated to X, C could not be the correct specification for 
the intentional states of desiring that Y and believing that not-X-ing would achieve Y. But 
if rationality was a set of possible configurations of physical states (possibly some states 
in the agent), then it provides no constraint against a world like W3. That is, if in our 
actual world, rationality was just a set of physical states, then we could always imagine 
that this set of physical states was present in W1, W2 and W3, such that together with the 
laws of nature in those worlds, C caused the respective states of motivation. 
 
That being the case, there would be nothing internally inconsistent about W3 such that it 
is not a possible world. Since rationality is taken as a matter of an agent having some 
possible configurations of physical states, the motivation resulting from an agent having 
those physical states would count as rational motivation. But since we know that the case 
in W3 is a case of irrational motivation, this could not be true. Hence rationality cannot be 
taken as a set of physical states. Note that this last argument does not in itself show that 
functionalism is false. All it shows is that we cannot take rationality to be somehow 
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composed of some physical state(s). 
 
This result in turn gives credence to the initial argument in this section. The functionalist 
cannot now deny that  
 
(B1’) Absent rational considerations, there is no natural (or nomological) necessity that 
(if P and BL, then γ). 
 
(B2’) Absent rational considerations, it is nevertheless a matter of natural (or 
nomological) necessity that (if C and BL, then γ). 
 
By saying that when we absent rational considerations, BL could not remain the same as 
in the rational case. Since rationality is neither a law of nature nor some physical state, BL 
stays the same whether the agent is rational or not. Hence, we can see that the intentional 
states cannot be reduced to physical causes. 
 
In the light of the three arguments from practical rationality, I think we can conclude that 
the intentional states of belief and desire are not reducible to causes. Since these 
intentional states often feature as reasons in purposive explanations (as argued in the 
previous chapter), it follows that such reasons are not reducible to causes. The upshot of 
this is that if we do in fact appeal to our beliefs and desires in giving purposive 
explanations, then some aspects of reality can only be explained by recourse to 
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irreducibly non-physical facts or properties. In the following sections, I will present two 
further arguments against functionalism in general. These arguments, I believe, show that 
functionalism is unable to capture the normativity inherent in rationality, and by extension, 
related to intentionality. 
 
 
- 3.3 Two Further Arguments Against Functionalism - 
 
In these last two sections, I put forth two arguments against functionalism.  
 
The first argument is a type of knowledge argument that aims to show that the 
normativity of external reasons cannot be captured by causal analyses. Since we have 
established in the previous chapter that intentional states work in response to external 
reasons, a causal account of intentionality fails to account for something. Furthermore, 
the argument will show that functional specifications are not complete specifications, 
since they fail to give us the requisite information about the agent’s rationality which we 
could obtain from the unanalyzed intentional states.  
 
The second argument tries to show that in general, functional specifications do not 
capture everything about intentional states. Since the last argument is more general, its 




- §3.3.1 The Rationality-Knowledge Argument - 
 
The argument I am going to put forward works for both practical and theoretical reasons, 
but I think the intuitive force is felt more strongly if we first consider the case of 
theoretical reasons. Theoretical reasons are reasons for belief. For example, if I accept the 
propositions “p” and “if p then q,” I have a reason to believe q as well. If I believe that 
John always tells the truth, I have a reason to believe whatever he says. 
 
Now it is generally acknowledged that for one to have knowledge, mere true belief is 
insufficient. Pre-Gettier, most people held that justified true belief would suffice for 
knowledge.93 After Gettier’s famously short paper questioning this assumption, there has 
been a multitude of theories trying to fill the gap between true belief and knowledge. 
Notwithstanding Gettier’s paper, the concept of justification remains useful. In particular, 
in evaluating whether a person is rational in having certain beliefs, justification takes 
center stage, because it is about having good reasons94 for belief.  
 
Now if justification involves having good reasons for belief, then we can show that 
reasons cannot be reduced to causes. For suppose I know all the causes of all beliefs there 
are in the world. From this knowledge alone, it is logically impossible to deduce whether 
                                                        
93
 Gettier, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" Gettier gives examples of justified true beliefs which do not 
seem to amount to knowledge.  
94
 Whether these reasons have to be known or accessible to the subject will depend on whether one subscribes 
to an internalist or externalist theory of justification. Furthermore, we are only concerned with epistemic 
reasons for belief, not other reasons such as pragmatic reasons. 
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any of these beliefs are justified. For in considering whether a belief B is justified, we are 
dealing with a normative notion. In effect, when we ask whether S has reasons to believe 
B, we are asking whether she ought to believe B. And in knowing the causes of the beliefs 
we have knowledge only of the descriptive facts, i.e. we only know how in fact people 
come to hold certain beliefs, not whether they should have those beliefs; not whether it is 
rationally appropriate for beliefs to be formed in such a way. But if reasons can be 
reduced to causes, then we should, by knowing merely the causes of beliefs, know also 
whether the beliefs were justified. Since this is not the case, reasons cannot be reduced to 
causes. We can call this the Argument from Normativity. 
 
Someone could dispute this by offering a causal theory of justification. Perhaps it is true 
that  
 
J: For a belief B to be justified, it is sufficient that certain conditions about its causal 
history are satisfied. 
 
For example, it might suffice for B to be formed by a reliable belief-forming process 
aimed at truth in order to be justified. And certain facts about how B is caused might in 
turn suffice for such processes. Thus, goes the objector, we can deduce whether a belief is 
justified from knowledge of its causal history alone. This objection misses the point of the 
argument. Even if a causal theory of justification is correct, knowledge of such a causal 
theory is not part of knowledge of the causes of beliefs. In other words, if J is true, I am 
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nevertheless unable to see whether a belief B is justified if I only know how B is caused – 
I need to know J as well.  
 
A more radical response would be to deny that justification involves any normativity 
whatsoever. This seems to be what Quine proposed in his paper “Epistemology 
Naturalized.” According to Quine,  
 
Epistemology, or something like it, simply falls into place as a chapter of psychology 
and hence of natural science. It studies a natural phenomenon, viz., a physical human 
subject. This human subject is accorded a certain experimentally controlled input … 
and in the fullness of time the subject delivers as output a description of the 
three-dimensional external world and its history. The relation between meager input 
and the torrential output is a relation that we are prompted to study for somewhat the 
same reasons that always prompted epistemology, namely, in order to see how 
evidence relates to theory, and in what way one’s theory of nature transcends any 
available evidence.95 
 
So, following Quine, the naturalist about reasons could argue that justification, as part of 
epistemology, is simply a study of the kinds of beliefs people who are considered rational 
tend to form. But what does such a claim really amount to? 
 
                                                        
95
 Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized,” 508. 
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In a trivial sense, epistemology studies a natural phenomenon - there is no doubt that in 
giving theories of justification, we do indeed look at cases of what we consider to be 
justified beliefs, and see whether those cases fit certain proposed criteria of justification. 
And those paradigm cases of justified belief are, insofar as they are had by human 
subjects, naturally caused.96 But traditionally at least, that is not all and not essentially 
what epistemology is about. Epistemology, to the extent that it is different from 
psychology, is concerned not with simply with belief formation per se, but the 
justification of beliefs. If justification is just about actual belief formation, then 
epistemology is simply redundant. It makes no sense to ‘naturalize’ epistemology – 
perhaps to abolish epistemology altogether, yes, but not naturalize it and still call it 
epistemology. As Kim remarks,  
 
The relation Quine speaks of between “meager input” and “torrential output” is a 
causal relation; at least it is qua causal relation that the naturalized epistemologist 
investigates it. It is none of the naturalized epistemologist’s business to assess 
whether, and to what degree, the input “justifies” the output, how a given irradiation 
of the subject’s retinas makes it “reasonable” or “rational” for the subject to emit 
certain representational output. His interest is strictly causal and nomological…97 
 
As such,  
                                                        
96
 This is not to say that all cases of justified beliefs are, or have to be naturally caused. On Plantinga’s theory of 
warrant as proper function, John Calvin’s “sensus divinitatis” is a case in point of a belief caused non-naturally. 
(See Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief). My point here is that even granted that beliefs are naturally formed, 
it does not follow that facts about whether beliefs are justified are natural facts. 
97
 Kim, “What is “Naturalized Epistemology”?” 334. 
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…it makes Quine’s attempt to relate his naturalized epistemology to traditional 
epistemology look lame. For in what sense is the study of causal relationships 
between physical stimulation of sensory receptors and the resulting cognitive output a 
way of “seeing how evidence relates to theory” in an epistemologically relevant sense? 
The causal relation between sensory input and cognitive output is a relation between 
“evidence” and “theory”; however, it is not an evidential relation.98 
 
Indeed, given any causal relation between input (evidence) and output (belief), we can 
always ask the further question whether the evidence offers any reason for the belief, or 
whether such output is reasonable given the input. Finally,  
 
…it is difficult to see how an “epistemology” that has been purged of normativity, 
one that lacks an appropriate normative concept of justification or evidence, can have 
anything to do with the concerns of traditional epistemology. And unless naturalized 
epistemology and classical epistemology share some of their central concerns, it’s 
difficult to see how one could replace the other, or be a way (a better way) of doing 
the other.99 
 
If Kim is right, then this whole talk of justification being stripped of normativity is 




 Ibid., 335. 
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meaningless.100 Normativity is the sine qua non of justification. It is one thing to deny 
justification altogether, it is another to try to make sense of justification sans normativity. 
The former is radical; the latter sounds like a confusion. It may be worthwhile to 
undertake the kind of investigation Quine proposes, but insofar as we are following 
Quine’s advice, we are not dealing with justification. 
 
But what if the naturalist takes the former line instead, and does away with the notion of 
justification altogether? This would be tantamount to denying that there are such things as 
normative reasons. While this eliminative line on reasons would be a possible response to 
a substantive theory of reasons, it carries no weight here. As we have already seen in the 
previous chapter, external reasons are normative, and there are such things as external 
reasons. Our current purposes have to do with the conceptual - to establish that reasons, if 
they exist, cannot be reduced to causes.101 To say that there are no reasons in reality is no 
more an objection to this than claiming that unicorns do not exist is an objection to the 
claim that the concept of a unicorn cannot be reduced to that of an ordinary horse.  
 
Now we can apply a similar kind of argument to rational motivation as well. Suppose I 
know all the functional states of a person S – states that correspond to beliefs, desires, 
motivations to act, and so on – and how they are interconnected. From this knowledge 
alone, it seems logically impossible to deduce whether any given connection between 
                                                        
100
 See also Putnam’s response to Quine, in “Why Reason Cannot Be Naturalized.” To be fair, Quine is not 
equating justification with epistemology. However, justification is what the imagined objector to the present 
argument is concerned with.  
101
 I do, of course, think that there are reasons and that people respond to reasons. But I do not argue for this 
here. 
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belief, desire and motivation is a rational one. For connections between actual functional 
states are just causal connections between states that are specified in terms of disjuncts of 
yet more causal connections. For instance, take a (simplified) functional state b such that 
 
∃b∃x∃y∃d (b tends to be caused by x and b tends to cause y in conjunction with 
d.) 
 
and functional state d such that 
 
∃d∃b∃w∃y (d tends to be caused by w and d tends to cause y in conjunction with 
b). 
 
We find an instance where  
 
S was in state d and state b, which then caused S to be in state y.  
 
This tells us nothing, however, about whether the connection is a rational connection 
between intentional states. Even if we knew that b is a belief, d is a desire, and y is 
motivation towards a certain action, we would not know whether the agent was rationally 
motivated at all. Perhaps, for whatever reason, the combination was as follows: 
 
Food. S had a desire to get some food (d), a belief that food was on the table in front 
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of her (b), and was motivated to walk away from the table (y).  
 
This would be a paradigm case of irrationality.102 But without the knowledge of the 
contents of the belief, desire and motivation, I could not have recognized it as rational or 
irrational. This is because while knowing everything about the causes of S’ motivation, I 
know nothing about the contents (i.e. meanings) of the states in question. And in order to 
know the reasons for S’ motivation, I need to know the (meaningful) contents of the states. 
Hence, I cannot know about the reasons for S’ being motivated just from knowing the 
causes.  
 
Clearly, no functionalist would give the type of specification I suggested above. The 
functionalist could claim that my example above of functional states misconstrues how 
they are actually specified. Functional states might be specified without recourse to 
mental terms like intentional states, but nevertheless make use of certain behaviors or 
behavioral dispositions. Such specifications might contain enough content for a deduction 
on rationality to be made. 
 
So then, the functionalist might argue that in the example Food, the functional states b 
and d might be specified as such: 
 
b:∃b∃d (b tends to be caused by visual recognition of food on a table and b tends 
                                                        
102
 Other things being equal, of course. 
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to cause motivation to obtain the food on the table in conjunction with d.) 
 
d:∃d∃b (d tends to be caused by lack of food for more than 6 hours and d tends to 
cause motivation to obtain the food on the table in conjunction with b103). 
 
In this case, the objection goes, if the resulting motivation given b and d was to walk 
away from the table without so much as an attempt to obtain the food (or anything that 
similarly disregards the food), then it would be a case of irrationality. And clearly, we can 
identify such cases from the specification of the states alone – these are cases that do not 
match up to what the functional specifications of the states claim the states tend to lead 
to.104  
 
But there is a ready reply here. For such a specification of states already presumes some 
kind of rationality. Either these states are specified a priori in view of notions of what 
counts as rational motivation, or these states are specified a posteriori from observation 
of agents that are known to be for the most part rational. If neither of the above is true, 
then there is no reason whatsoever for the objector to claim that b and d have to be 
specified in the way that the objection does above. And as a rejoinder to such 
specifications, we could simply construct a hypothetical world (say planet X) where 
creatures tend to act irrationally 50% of the time. In the case of planet X, we could ask the 
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 Strictly speaking, this should be more general, such as: d:∃d∃b (d tends to be caused by lack of food for 
more than 6 hours and d tends to cause motivation to obtain the food in conjunction with some b-type state that 
recognizes food in a certain location from that location).  
104
 Obviously, the specification cannot claim that the functional states never lead to some irrational motivation, 
for in that case the Food example would falsify those specifications. At most, such claims as those above can 
only rest on probability. 
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objector, should the specifications of functional states vary from our own world?  
 
Now if the answer is no, then obviously the objector’s initial specifications should be 
modified so as to exclude the part that says that the states tend to lead to obtainment of 
food. For in planet X this would be false. Once this part is omitted, the original argument 
holds. 
 
If the answer is yes (i.e. specifications of the functional states can vary), again the 
objection fails. For now I need an extra item of knowledge in order to determine whether 
the connections between the states is a rational connection; namely, I need to know 
whether these specifications are indeed specifications that apply to worlds where agents 
are primarily rational, primarily irrational, or something else.  
 
Furthermore, it is not simply the case that the current examples fail to be good functional 
specifications. Even though these simple examples do not exhaust the vast amount of 
literature on functionalist accounts of mental content, they make an important point. For 
any functional specification, the functional states must include behavioral 
states/dispositions outside of the mental realm. It would not do for the specifications to 
contain merely internal relations of mental states. As a consequence, the general strategy 
employed above would apply to other kinds of specifications as well.  
 
Since we could tell merely by looking at the unanalyzed intentional states alone whether 
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the agent was rational, it follows that the intentional states cannot be reduced to physical 
causes. 
 
The last objection to this would be to deny that knowledge of the intentional states alone 
would yield knowledge about whether their connections were rational. For someone could 
plausibly claim that we think so only because we have implicitly assumed rational norms 
such as the Principle of Instrumental Rationality. If we did not assume these norms, we 
would not be able to make evaluations regarding the agent’s rationality from her 
intentional states alone.  
 
But again, a quick reply is at hand. We could simply modify the argument and say that it 
would be impossible to know if the agent was rational even if we knew the functional 
specifications of the intentional states and rational norms like the Principle of 
Instrumental Rationality. Knowing these rational norms would not help us in accessing 
the functional states.  
 
All in all, this argument shows that there is something to the contents of mental states – 
their meanings – that cannot be captured in a causal account, something that is essential to 





- §3.3.2 The Conceivability Argument - 
 
The general argument is as follows: 
 
F1. Specifications of a functional state must involve causal relations between the state in 
question and other states.  
F2. Either these other states are other mental states, or they are non-mental states (e.g. 
bodily states) of the agent or the environment that she is in.  
F3. If they include the latter two, then functional states are insufficiently general 
characterizations of mental states. 
F4. If functionalism is insufficiently general, then mental states cannot be reduced to 
functional states. 
F5. If they only comprise other mental states, then it is impossible to give meaningful 
information about the states. 
F6. If functionalism does not give meaningful information about mental states, then 
mental states cannot be reduced to functional states.  
F7. Hence mental states cannot be reduced to functional states. (2, 4, 6).  
 
I take F1 to be ucontroversial. F3 and F5 are the independent premises, and I will argue 
for each in turn.  
 
Argument for F3: 
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Consider a typical functional analysis of a belief that I am in pain:105 
 
∃x∃y∃z∃w (x tends to be caused by bodily injury & x tends to produce states y, z, 
and w & x tends to occur with wincing or moaning). (where y, z and w are other 
mental states) 
 
Now this analysis does not account for scenarios such as this: Suppose God simply causes 
me to feel a pain in my left arm, without my arm having undergone any sort of change at 
all.106 He also makes it the case that I am unable to wince or moan even if I tried, perhaps 
by counteracting whatever impulses my brain sends to the rest of my body. Nevertheless, 
I believe that I am in pain. (Perhaps I also believe (falsely) that it has been caused by 
bodily injury to my left arm, and want to wince and moan, only to find that I can’t.) 
Clearly, it is not the case that this belief that I am in pain was caused by bodily injury, nor 
did it occur with or produce any sort of pain-behavior such as wincing. Still, it remains 
true that I had a belief that I was in pain. It simply does not make sense to say that under 
such conditions, I would have to have a different belief. 
 
The thing to note here is that there is nothing special about this functional specification 
that makes it susceptible to this sort of objection. It is not as if some other functional 
specification that nevertheless refers to terms external to the agent could somehow escape 
the charge. The point is that it is always logically possible that a mental state could occur 
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 As opposed to the state of being in pain. 
106
 We could substitute God with Descartes’ Evil Genius, or highly intelligent and powerful aliens, if we liked. 
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without certain environmental conditions and without certain bodily/behavioral events 
having occurred.  
 
To be sure, the claim is not that this functional specification is not a true description of 
the state. It might very well be the case that in our world, a belief that I am in pain tends 
to be caused by bodily injury, and so on.107 It is also a true specification that of the 
mental state of “believing that I am in pain”, x, that 
 
∃x (x tends to be referred to in philosophical discussions more frequently than 
Britney Spears is).  
 
The point, rather, is that regardless of whether they are true or not, functional 
specifications that appeal to non-mental terms are not complete specifications. They do 
not tell us everything about the mental states there is to know. And hence mental states 
cannot be reduced to such functional counterparts.  
 
Argument for F5: 
What about functional specifications that do not appeal to any non-mental terms? The 
prospects seem bleaker here. If no non-mental terms are to be used, then all we have are 
internal relations between mental states. This is all well and good, except that functional 
specifications are meant to be analyses of mental state terms themselves and thus cannot 
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 Though I am not sure how someone could prove this empirically.  
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include such terms. Thus, suppose we want to provide a functional specification of the 
“belief that I am in pain.” A plausible set of relations might be such that: 
 
∃x (x tends to produce the belief that there is something wrong with the body, and 
the desire to relieve the pain.) 
 
This being a functional specification, the corresponding belief and desire will have to be 
analysed as other functional states. Hence, we have: 
 
∃x∃y∃z (x tends to produce y and z) 
 
Obviously, this is not saying much. And it would not do much good to say that all we 
need to do is to look up the specifications for y and z. For the specification for y would 
just be something else like  
 
∃x∃y∃w∃(y tends to be caused by x and to produce w). 
 
And similarly for z. It is clear enough that mental states are simply underspecified in such 
cases. The upshot of this argument is not so much that functionalism is a false theory, in 
the sense that it does not accurately denote mental states, but that mental states are 
irreducible to their functional descriptions.  
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It might be objected that the conceivability claim in the argument for F3 is suspect. As this is 
not the place to debate about modal epistemology or whether conceivability entails possibility, 
my argument might not convince all. Still, I do think that there is a prima facie case here. 
Some principle like the following seems reasonable about our modal intuitions: 
 
M1: If a state-of-affairs P is conceivable, then we are prima facie justified in believing 
that P is possible. 
 
 By prima facie justification, I mean that this modal belief could be defeated. And it could be 
defeated if we have good reason to believe something like both of the following propositions: 
 
(i) Q,  
(ii) if Q, then necessarily not-P.108 
 
Of course, if we judge ourselves to have good reasons to believe Q, then the conceivability of 
P does not secure the possibility of P straight off. But even then, it should be taken as a 
consideration in favor of discarding the belief in Q. Whether Q should be ultimately discarded 
is a matter of weighing the strength of our intuitions and evidence, and that is a topic for 
another time. Suffice to say that the Conceivability Argument makes a case that functionalists 
should take notice of and respond to.  
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 See Yablo, “Is Conceivability a guide to possibility?,” 34. 
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This argument thus concludes my case, and we can move on to review the whole enterprise of 
this thesis. 
 100 
- §4 Conclusion - 
 
It is time to bring things to a close. In the opening chapter, I distinguished between two 
questions concerning intentional states which feature as reasons in purposive explanations 
- the Substantive Question and the Conceptual Question. The former question concerns 
whether intentional states as we understand them are real and efficacious. The latter 
question addresses the issue of whether these intentional states can be reduced to physical, 
causal accounts. 
 
In Chapter 2, I argued that intentional states are indispensable to reasons-explanations in 
response to the Substantive Question. I distinguished between internal reasons (as 
intentional states) and external reasons, and argued that we should neither give up internal 
nor external reasons. In doing so, I also argued that semantic epiphenomenalism and 
eliminativism of intentional states are false. It is also noteworthy that in defending 
external reasons against the Causal Objection in §2.2.1, I also argued that an agent’s 
response to external reasons cannot be reduced to causes. There we have the first 
argument for the irreducibility of intentionality. 
 
In Chapter 3, I moved on to address the Conceptual Question proper, arguing that 
intentionality is irreducible to physical causes. The main thrust of my case was given 
through three arguments from practical reason. Finally, I gave two further arguments 
aimed particularly at functionalism.  
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Taken together, the conclusions arrived at in Chapters 2 and 3 entail that some aspects of 
the world can only be explained via the non-physical. Ergo, physicalism is false. 
 
I would like to think that the collective weight of these arguments should be sufficient to 
convince anyone that physicalism, at least with respect to intentional states, is mistaken 
about the nature of the mind. But more realistically, I am hopeful that they will move at 
least the agnostic or the neutral observer who has not decided between the varieties of 
physicalism and dualism to opt for the latter (except for epiphenomenalism). 109 
Physicalism is tempting in when viewed from some quarters; particularly if we are taken 
in by the progressive naturalization of phenomena to natural laws and physical states by 
modern science. It seems as if the mind is the final frontier for science to colonize, and no 
doubt many have the feeling that science will succeed; if not today, then in the near future. 
What’s more, a theory of reality that admits of only one kind of substance - physical stuff 
- seems to have simplicity on its side.110 
 
But as I have briefly remarked on at the end of Chapter 2, there comes a time when we 
should be willing to relook and modify our metaphysical commitments. Physicalism has 
been on the scene long enough, and in my opinion, there has not been any theory in 
physicalism that truly stands up against the various objections dealt against it. Enough has 
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 Obviously, the various forms of dualism suffer from their own problems, but there is no space to address 
them here. I believe that they are not insurmountable, however. 
110
 Although one might also point out that the properties, categories and laws relating to physical stuff are 
terribly complex. 
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been said by way of arguing that the phenomenal realm of consciousness is non-physical, 
I believe, to disturb even the staunchest physicalist.111 Much as also been said to deny 
that psychological and intentional mental states can be reduced to physical states, though 
with perhaps less convincing results. My own contribution is aimed at bolstering these 
latter objections to physicalism, so that we can show that physicalism fails as a whole. 
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